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Democracy in Collective Bargaining
Alan Hydet
The leadership of Willie's union has emerged from an all-night session
with employer representatives bearing a tentative collective agreement cov-
ering Willie's wages, vacations, working hours, health benefits, seniority,
bumping rights, right to strike, protection against discipline, and so forth,
for the next three years. Now the agreement is ready to be submitted to a
ratification vote.
Perhaps it will never be submitted, however. Although federal law re-
quires votes by a union's membership on its dues and officers, the domi-
nant interpretation is entirely indifferent as to whether Willie gets to vote
on his contract. Perhaps Willie and his co-members passed a resolution in
advance of negotiations forbidding negotiators to agree to any calculation
of seniority on other than a plant-wide basis. If the negotiated agreement
adopts departmental seniority, however, it is unlikely that Willie can do
anything about it.' Perhaps the constitution or by-laws of Willie's union
require that proposed agreements be ratified by the members. If the lead-
ership fails to do this, it is equally unlikely that Willie can do anything
about it.2 As we shall see, union members who sue to .require their unions
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to submit agreements to ratification lose a shocking proportion of the
cases.
Perhaps the leadership has conducted a ratification vote. Yet, it is far
from clear that Willie has the same right to have the union distribute
information or circulate opposing views that he would have if the vote
were on the union's constitution or a merger agreement.' Willie has no
right to receive a copy of, or even to see, the text of the proposed agree-
ment.4 He has no right to compel compliance with the majority vote: An
agreement may have been voted down by the membership, or never sub-
mitted to them, and yet their union and employer may nevertheless be
under a duty to execute it.5 Such a contract may be specifically enforced,'
and the newly bound employees may be barred from replacing the offend-
ing union.7 Certainly no court has required notice to the membership,
informative ballot proposals, or any particular form of ballot for ratifica-
tion of a contract.8
I do not suppose that these facts about Willie's rights will shock many
experienced scholars or labor lawyers.' But how has this divorce of collec-
tive bargaining from democracy come about? How has a body of law that
purportedly advances union democracy had the opposite effect on collec-
tive bargaining?
In order to answer this question, I would like to introduce two models
or ideal types of collective bargaining: democratic and elitist bargaining.
Democratic bargaining includes the participation of the membership in
the articulation of demands for contract negotiations, communication be-
tween negotiators and membership on the state of negotiations, rank-and-
file representation on the negotiating team throughout the negotiation,
ratification by the membership of all proposed settlements, legal supervi-
3. See Sheldon v. O'Callaghan, 497 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir.) (right to circulate views opposing new
constitution), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1090 (1974); Blanchard v. Johnson, 388 F. Supp. 208 (N.D.
Ohio 1975) (access to mailing lists for opponents of local affiliation with particular national union),
aff'd, 532 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869 (1976).
4. Compare Blanchard (affiliation referendum enjoined until members informed of all terms of
proposed inter-union agreement) with Gilliam v. Independent Steelworkers Union, 572 F. Supp. 168
(N.D. W. Va. 1983) (membership had no right to see collective bargaining agreement before
ratification).
5. See infra pp. 802-05; cf. Pignotti v. Local 3 Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 477 F.2d 825
(8th Cir.) (leaders obligated by Landrum-Griffin Act to comply with majority decision not to partici-
pate in national pension plan), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973).
6. See infra note 44.
7. See infra pp. 799-801.
8. See infra pp. 815-19.
9. Indeed, commentators frequently take it as a sign of the sophistication of American legislation
that union democracy has been limited to internal union administration and has not modified collec-
tive bargaining. See, e.g., Soffer, Collective Bargaining and Federal Regulation of Union Govern-
ment, in REGULATING UNION GOVFRNMENT 106 (1964); Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases
of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MicH. L.
REV. 1435, 1474-78 (1963).
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sion of the ratification to ensure accurate and understandable information
on proposed contracts, the right to oppose proposed contracts, rational vot-
ing methods, and compliance by the leadership with the results of the
vote. An essential feature of this ideal model of democratic bargaining is
that it treats democracy as a right of membership: Democratic participa-
tion is required despite utilitarian arguments against its use in a particu-
lar case.10
By contrast, the model of elitist collective bargaining assumes that the
top leaders of a union speak for the union. In fact, "the union" often
refers only to the top leadership."' A relatively small group of leaders
articulates demands, forms the bargaining priorities, negotiates with the
employer, and concludes a binding agreement.
It is important to see that elitist bargaining is not necessarily hostile to
democratic forms. Polls of the membership may assist the leaders' forma-
tion of demands; expressions of public support from the membership may
strengthen the leaders' negotiating position. In the elitist model, however,
democracy is never favored for its own sake. It is rather a means to some
other end, justified by policy, not principle.
This distinction clarifies contemporary American legal protection of
union democracy in general and democratic collective bargaining in par-
ticular. The courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as-
sume that elitist bargaining is the norm and thereby perpetuate it. Despite
a statute which would permit a principled right to democracy,' 2 the courts
and the NLRB give limited effect to elements of union practice that foster
democratic bargaining, such as union constitutions or by-laws which cre-
ate democratic procedures for demand formation or ratification. Indeed,
the courts advance democratic bargaining only when assured that such
democracy will not disadvantage more fundamental policy interests, such
as harmony between employers and "unions" (read union elites) or con-
trol of inflation.
In Part I of this Article, I survey the present legal status of democracy
10. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-100 (1977). There is considerable literature to
the effect that the sort of utilitarian considerations appropriate in legislative choice should not domi-
nate judicial application of rights under the resulting statute. See Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 44
PHIL REv. 2 (1955); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 222-23 (1973). I have found this latter distinction helpful
in criticizing the extent to which those examining collective bargaining see democracy less as a right
than as a sometimes-appropriate policy, to be adhered to only where it helps to achieve other ends.
11. Branch 6000, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
("delegation of the decisionmaking function to the union membership") (discussed infra note 102);
Davis v. Washington State Council of Carpenters, 47 L.R.R.M. 2245, 2247 (W.D. Wash. 1960)
("No rights were granted to individuals to inject themselves into the collective bargaining procedures
. ... ) (discussed infra note 57).
12. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257,
73 Stat. 519 (codified at scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1976)) (LMRDA).
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in collective bargaining. Until the late 1970's, no reported cases protected
democracy in collective bargaining. In the past few years, a line of appel-
late cases has suggested, without extensive analysis, that some doc-
trines-such as the equal right of union members to participate in deliber-
ations and voting, the rights of speech and assembly, the duty of fair
representation, and the fiduciary obligation of union officers-might all
apply to the formation of demands in negotiations or the execution of con-
tracts. None of the recent cases, however, actually provides effective relief
for infringements of democratic collective bargaining.
It is easy to see in this judicial queasiness about remedy the continued
working of the attitudes which for so long impeded any application of
union democracy law to collective bargaining-a queasiness which, I ar-
gue in Part II, rests on latent judicial fear derived from the dominant
industrial relations literature on the economic effect of democratic collec-
tive bargaining. If, as I argue, courts that deny workers any right to dem-
ocratic bargaining are guided primarily by their estimation of the antici-
pated economic results of extending such democracy, a practitioner hoping
to achieve democratic collective bargaining cannot expect to succeed by
extending the abstract principles of union democracy set forth in the Bill
of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations.13 The practitioner must
rather speak to the courts' inarticulate concerns.
An advocate of change must contend with the rationales of the status
quo. In Part III of this Article, I examine the rationales which, though
inarticulate in judicial opinions, assertedly support a restricted legal role
in this area. I argue that these arguments are either unproved or misap-
plied, and they generally do not justify excepting collective bargaining
from the general law of union democracy. Since in my view the underpin-
nings of the courts' rationales compel support for, or at least neutrality
towards, democratic collective bargaining, I have not gone further here to
criticize those underpinnings.1
13. LMRDA, §§ 101-05, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1976).
14. This is a distasteful procedure to some extent, since I believe that one can defend on philo-
sophical grounds, even within a liberal tradition, the right of working people to participate in deci-
sions that affect them. Since courts treat democracy as an element of policy, however, it seems neces-
say to confront the policies head-on.
One major obstacle in contemporary American labor law to the recognition of such a right to
democratic participation is the relentless attempt to recast essentially political struggles as disputes
over economic interest. I have illustrated and criticized this ideology elsewhere. See Hyde, Economic
Labor Law v. Political Labor Relations: Dilemmasfor Liberal Legalism, 60 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1981);
Hyde, Beyond Collective Bargaining: The Politicization of Labor Relations Under Government Con-
tract, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 1. By examining political problems commonly understood by legal personnel
in economic or nonpolitical terms, the present Article is another attempt to make the law acknowledge
authentic political participation in labor relations. For discussions of participation in collective bar-
gaining that discount all but economic factors, see, e.g., Alexander v. International Union of Operat-
ing Eng'rs, 624 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussed infra note 65); Anderson v. United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, 641 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1981) (discussed infra notes 90-91).
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I. THE LEGAL PROTECTION ACTUALLY AFFORDED DEMOCRATIC
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Our initial problem is to understand why courts have been reluctant to
require of the collective bargaining process the same democracy that they
unhesitatingly require in other union decisions. Solving this problem re-
quires us to examine several legal doctrines relating to contract ratification
in contexts not ostensibly concerned with employee rights, which will bet-
ter permit us to understand some of the unstated assumptions from which
the courts proceed.
A. The Law of Ratification of Collective Agreements
1. Federal Statutes Requiring Ratification as a Way of Avoiding
Strikes
No federal labor law generally requires union leaders to submit pro-
posed contracts to the membership. Federal statutes, however, do author-
ize the government to submit proposed contracts in two circumstances.
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) may submit an
employer's last offer to an employee vote, as a means of inducing settle-
ment of a dispute over a new contract.1 5 Similar "last-offer" submission is
required in the case of presidentially determined emergencies, if the strike
has been enjoined by a United States district court. 6
These provisions were enacted as part of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, and their empirical predicate is obvious:
At least some of the time, the rank and file would be more "reasona-
ble"-more accepting of the employer's last offer-than their leaders.' 7
The provisions obviously fall short of a principled commitment to union
democracy, but they do permit such democracy to be invoked selectively by
the federal government as an instrumental technique of achieving indus-
trial settlements and avoiding strikes. We will find this instrumental ap-
preciation of the uses of democracy to be the hallmark of most current
grants of union democracy.
Not much needs to be said about this particular instrumental use of
democracy. Democracy has failed its intended purpose, and has rarely
been invoked. Apparently, no employer's last offer rejected by union lead-
ers has ever been accepted by the membership under the national emer-
15. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, § 203(c), 29 U.S.C. § 173(c)
(1976) (LMRA). This is the only "settlement technique" given by statute to the FMCS, which must
otherwise rely solely on persuasion.
16. LMRA § 209(b), 29 U.S.C. § 179(b) (1976).
17. See 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr: 1947,
at 1008 (1948).
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gency provision.18 As for FMCS's discretion to submit last offers, the Ser-
vice distrusted this technique from the beginning. Indeed, it initially took
the position that it would not unilaterally conduct such ballots, and would
propose the device to parties only where efforts at settlements by other
means had been exhausted.1 9 Last-offer ballots have occasionally been
conducted over the years, and although the FMCS does not keep compre-
hensive records on the use of the device, 0 the consensus among profession-
als is that last-offer ballots are largely ineffectual in settling disputes. 21 So
the provisions have lain, largely dead letters; they have provided no basis
for a more general federal policy favoring ratification of collective
agreements.
2. The Law of Ratification Before 1959
Until 1959, the only law of ratification of collective agreements con-
cerned whether the absence of ratification would prevent a collective
agreement from being effective among employers, unions, and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board; only those actors litigated the legal signifi-
cance of ratification or nonratification. During this period, employees
rarely sought judicial enforcement of democracy in collective bargaining.
This litigation decided when an agreement was effective to bar further
employee organizational activity under the Board's contract bar rules,
when an employer or union had committed an unfair labor practice by
refusing to sign an agreement, and when an agreement was judicially en-
forceable. While there is no logical reason for all these legal consequences
to ensue at the same moment, the decisions in all three types of cases
encouraged relatively early agreement. Since employee ratification votes
delayed the onset of the blissful contractual state, they were disfavored in
all three types of cases. In each, the public "interest" in labor peace de-
feated the employees' interest in participation in collective bargaining.
Since these assumptions were critical when employees later sought to vin-
dicate directly their right to ratify agreements, it is necessary to explore
cases determining the moment of effectiveness of labor contracts.
18. D. Box & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNrrY 78 n.* (1970); Jones, The
National Emergency Disputes Provisions of the Tafi-Hartley Act: A View from a Legislative Drafts-
man's Desk, 17 W. RESERVE L. REv. 133, 214 (1965); Marshall, New Perspectives on National
Emergeny Disputes, 18 LAB. L.J. 451, 455 (1967).
19. Operation of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947: Hearings Before the Joint Commit-
tee on Labor-Management Relations, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1180-83 (1948) (statement of Peter Seitz,
General Counsel of the FMCS); 1 FMCS ANN. REP. 19, 34-35 (1948).
20. Union Membership Rejection of Contract Settlements, 1967 LAB. Rms- Y.B. 334 (FMCS
Study).
21. A. Cox, LAw AND THE NAMONAL LABOR PoLIcY 54 (1960); Cohen, The Strike Ballot and
Other Compulsory Balloting, 7 LABoR L.J. 146, 153 (1956).
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a. The Contract Bar Rule
The most extensive legal discussion of the effects of ratification votes
has been by the National Labor Relations Board, which decides whether
collective agreements will bar organizational efforts by rival unions. This
obscure corner of labor law has brought forth doctrine minimizing the
effects of contract rejection. Without much reflection, this doctrine has
carried over into all proceedings where the effect of a contract rejection is
at issue.
The National Labor Relations Act includes one limit on the timing of
petitions to the NLRB to conduct a representation election. 2 The claim
was made early in the Act's administration that stability in labor relations
required some additional administrative limitations on the exercise of the
right.2" The Act itself, however, does not require, or even suggest, that the
existence of a collective bargaining agreement should somehow limit the
availability of representation elections. One could therefore argue that
Congress had already struck the balance in favor of the employees' right
to change bargaining representatives at any time not specifically precluded
by statutory provision. The Board has nonetheless felt itself authorized to
alter the balance. In particular, it has always been receptive to the basic
claim that contracts might bar representation proceedings. While the exact
contours of the bar have varied over the years in ways not now material,24
the competing considerations have invariably remained the same: the em-
ployees' interest in free choice of representatives against the interest of the
employer, the union and, assertedly, the public in stable collective rela-
tionships. 5 The "balancing" of these interests in individual cases re-
mained particularly static. The employees' "interest" in availability of
elections, and the "interest" of the employer and union in stability have
been treated as abstractions unvarying in strength. What is said to have
changed is the strength of the public "interest" as interpreted by the
Board.26
22. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976), provides
that: "No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the
preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held."
23. The Board bars elections within twelve months of a union's certification, see Brooks v.
NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954), or within a "reasonable period" after an employer's voluntary recogni-
tion of a union, see Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583 (1966).
24. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY: A STUDY OF
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 155-60 (1950); C. SUMMERS, H. WELLINGTON
& A. HYDE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW, 755-59 (2d ed. 1982).
25. On the ideology of such "balancing of interests," see Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the
Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265,
309-10 (1978).
26. For an example of such a shift, see the Board's decision in Reed Roller Bit Co., 72 N.L.R.B.
927 (1947), holding that contrary industry practice would no longer be admissible to challenge as
"unreasonable" a two-year collective agreement whose duration was then "not customary in the in-
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What of the question of whether the contract that bars a new election
must have been ratified by the employees? The Board could have assumed
a model of democratic collective bargaining, under which employee ratifi-
cation would be normal and contracts would be presumed ineffective until
such ratification. Indeed, the Board might have even taken seriously the
slogan of "industrial democracy" and made such ratification mandatory
before a contract would bar an election. By contrast, under the model of
elitism, employee ratification is permissible only in the service of some
greater goal. If the goal is stability, employee ratification is at best irrele-
vant, and at worst a dilatory impediment to the achievement of a stable
contract.27
The Board has never taken an "employee rights" position that would
require contracts to be ratified in order to bar any representation proceed-
ings. At one point, the Board did require contracts to be approved by
whatever chains of command the union (and the employer on its side) had
created on their own,2 8 but even this concession to ratification was short-
lived.29 Moreover, this limited requirement was obviously not much pro-
tection for employee rights, since both employer and union have an inter-
est in quick approval procedures that spare the employer the bother, and
dustry." In the name of industrial stability, the Board allowed the agreement to bar any representa-
tion proceedings during its term:
For large masses of employees collective bargaining has but recently emerged from a stage of
trial and error, during which its techniques and full potentialities were being slowly developed
under the encouragement and protection of the Act. To have insisted in the past upon pro-
longed adherence to a bargaining agent, once chosen, would have been wholly incompatible
with this experimental and transitional period. It was especially necessary, therefore, to lay
emphasis upon the right of workers to select and change their representatives. Now, however,
the emphasis can better be placed elsewhere. We think that the time has come when stability
of industrial relations can be better served, without unreasonably restricting employees in their
right to change representatives, by refusing to interfere with bargaining relations secured by
collective agreements of 2 years' duration. Such contracts, even in the presence of a contrary
custom in the industry, should ordinarily preclude a determination of representatives until
shortly before their terminal dates.
Id. at 930 (emphasis in original, citation omitted). The Board has since extended the "contract bar" to
three years and once more redefined the public interest. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123,
1125-26 (1962).
27. The association between the existence of collective agreement and "industrial stability" is a
constant theme in postwar labor law. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
574, 578 (1960). Despite its constant reiteration, the proposition has little empirical support. During
World War II, for example, increased numbers of collective agreements and a union no-strike pledge
were associated with extremely high levels of industrial unrest. See N. LICHiTENSTEiN, LABOR'S WAR
AT HOME: THE CIO IN WORLD WAR 11133-35 (1982); Freeman, Delivering the Goods: Industrial
Unions During World War I1, 19 LAB. HIsT. 570 (1975). The United States figures annually among
the leaders of the industrialized world both in the specificity and enforceability of collective agree-
ments and in all measures of industrial conflict. Kassalow, Industrial Conflict and Consensus In the
U.S. and Western Europe, in LABOR RELATIoNs IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SocIEs: ISSUES AND
PROBLEMS (B. Martin & E. Kassalow eds. 1980); Shalev, Industrial Relations Theory and the Coin-
parative Study of Industrial Relations and Industrial Conflict, 28 BRITrr. J. INDuS. REI. 26 (1980).
28. Roddis Plywood & Door Co., Inc., 84 N.L.R.B. 309 (1949).
29. Roddis was overruled in Appalachian Shale Prods. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1958).
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the union the direct challenge, of representation proceedings. Even this
modest tolerance of union ratification procedures in any case diminished
over the years-doubtless keeping pace with the national interest in stabil-
ity. The first sign of weakening was finding a bar to representation pro-
ceedings in a contract rejected in a vote of the local but later signed by the
union and employer since the union's constitution did not require that the
agreement be ratified.80 Subsequently, in Appalachian Shale,1 the Board
held that the document relevant to determining when membership rejec-
tion would prevent the contract from serving as a bar, was not the union's
constitution-even where the constitution unambiguously required ratifi-
cation-but rather the contract. This focus "eliminates the litigation of
factual issues" in representation proceedings and "gives greater weight to
the language of the contract itself."
'8
3
Since the Board never imposed its own ratification requirement, the
only employees who had the right to ratify were those who could claim it
under the union constitution. Following Appalachian Shale, the legal ef-
fect of a union's inclusion in contract of a ratification provision is to in-
crease its own vulnerability to challenges by rival unions." Appalachian
Shale, then, cuts off rights to organize for a certain number of employees
who have been deprived of their right to ratify under their own union
constitution, all in the supposed public interest in stabilizing industrial
relations. The Appalachian Shale doctrine, however, remains the Board's
policy. The Board has appliedit expansively, even where giving "greater
weight to the language of the contract itself" has required extensive litiga-
tion, in representation proceedings, of the meaning of that language."
b. Bargaining in Good Faith
Another aspect of the NLRB's hostility to ratification is the doctrine
that the duty to bargain in good faith 5 may require an employer or union
to execute an unratified agreement. From the Board's "public interest"
30. Texas Co., Port Arthur Works, 112 N.L.R.B. 189 (1955); see also Midland Rubber Corp.,
108 N.L.R.B. 930 (1954) (contract, ratified by majority of union members but rejected in petition by
majority of unit employees, held to bar representation proceedings).
31. Appalachian Shale Prods. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1958).
32. Id. at 1162.
33. The union's assent to the contractual ratification clause may be presumed. It is an unfair
labor practice for the employer to insist on such a clause. Houchens Mkt., Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d
208 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Darlington Veneer Co., 236 F.2d 85, 87 (4th Cir. 1956); cf. NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (employer violates § 8(a)(5) in insisting on
"last offer ballot" clause).
34. In Swift & Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 49 (1974) (3-2 decision), the Board construed the phrase "sub-
ject to ratification by the Local Unions" in the Master Agreement between the employer and a na-
tional union to mean a majority of total union membership, not a majority in each local. The contract
thereby served to bar organizational activity at a plant that had never even voted on it.
35. See NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976); id. § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3).
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viewpoint, this doctrine resolves exactly the same problem as the doctrine
of contract bars: In both instances, ratification is an impediment to the
contractual stability that the Board is supposed to promote.36 Conse-
quently, the analysis employs the same distinction between ratification re-
quirements: Those agreed to by union and employer, typically in the ten-
tative agreement itself, may be a defense to charges of failure to bargain in
good faith, while ratification obligations found in the union's constitution,
by-laws, or practice, may not.
3 7
Under the proposed model of democratic collective bargaining, any doc-
trine that discourages employee ratification bears a heavy burden of justi-
fication. There is a good argument that submitting a proposal to employ-
ees should never be a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith, unless
the submission was bad faith as a pretext to frustrate agreement. 8 It may
appear that the employer's or union's duty to execute an unratified agree-
ment does less harm to employees' rights than the rules governing contract
bars, which add insult to injury by telling employees deprived of their
right to ratify contracts under the union constitution that they are now
further deprived of their statutory right to change bargaining representa-
tives. Whatever difference exists between the two situations, however, ob-
tains solely because of the Board's policy, which regards the duty to bar-
gain as a duty owed the public or the other party but not employees
directly. Indeed, employees are generally not a party to duty-to-bargain
cases.39 Under a model of democratic collective bargaining, employees are
legitimate participants in the collective bargaining process, with individual
36. See supra note 26.
37. North Country Motors, Ltd., 146 N.L.R.B. 671 (1964); see NLRB v. Seneca Envt'l Prods.,
646 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir. 1981); Southland Dodge, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 276 (1973); De Palma Printing
Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 31 (1973). These cases treat employers, but unions also violate § 8(b)(3) in refus-
ing to execute an agreed-upon but unratified agreement, unless ratification is a term of the contract
itself. See NLRB v. Truckdrivers Local 100, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 532 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1976)
(union commits unfair labor practice in refusing to execute agreement rejected unanimously by mem-
bership); NLRB v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 8, 465 F.2d 974 (9th Cir.
1972); Office & Professional Employees Local 42, 226 N.L.R.B. 991, 997-98 (1976); Local 9, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 210 N.L.R.B. 129, 131-32 (1974).
38. There are § 8(b)(3) cases that do not adopt the simplistic collective agreement/constitution
distinction, but rather test a union's ratification against an overall bad-faith standard. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Brotherhood of Painters Local 1385, 334 F.2d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1964) (submission to
ratification bad faith in light of thirty years' contrary practice and continual representation that presi-
dent could bind union); NLRB v. New Britain Mach. Co., 210 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1954) (Frank,
J.) (union negotiators did not waive right to certain information from employers when membership
rejected settlement the next day, given no bad faith by union). Employers' complaints of surprise at
unions' ratification procedures have a hollow ring in light of LMRDA § 201(a)(5)(K), 29 U.S.C. §
431(a)(5)(K) (1976), requiring unions to report to the Secretary of Labor their procedures for con-
tract ratification.
39. The General Counsel is likely to dismiss charges of employer refusal to bargain filed by
individual employees where the union has decided not to file a charge. See 102 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 237 (Nov. 19, 1979).
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and group rights to good-faith bargaining. This right should not be termi-
nated upon conclusion of an agreement that employees never saw.
Even on the Board's policy terms, the hostility to ratification in the
duty-to-bargain context has two unfortunate effects. First, it provides
more support for the judicial conception that the "typical" collective
agreement is not ratified by the employees affected. Second, and more sur-
prisingly, this body of law sometimes requires either a union40 or an em-
ployer41 to execute an agreement that employees have decisively rejected.
It is not easy to find a reason for this result. If the union's submission to
ratification came as a surprise to the employer, then this might be part of
a union's overall bad faith (although here again an employee rights ap-
proach would be disinclined to find bad faith in any polling of employ-
ees).42 Courts have held, however, that good faith requires execution of
agreements actually rejected by employees even without a finding that rat-
ification was employed as a device to avoid agreement. 3
By contrast, seeing ratification as simply a manifestation of the employ-
40. NLRB v. Truckdrivers Local 100, 532 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1976); Office & Professional Em-
ployees Local 42, 226 N.L.R.B. 991, 997-98 (1976). A fortiori, a union does not breach the duty of
fair representation owed employees when it enters into a collective agreement that employees have
actually rejected, if ratification is not a condition precedent contained in the collective agreement itself.
Teamsters "General" Local 200, 111 L.R.R.M. 1685 (NLRB Gen. Coun. Div. Adv. 1982).
41. NLRB v. Cheese Barn, Inc., 558 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1977); Martin J. Barry Co., 241 NLRB
1011 (1979) (offer rejected 42-3 before its "approval" at second meeting, 16-6, with no notice that
contract would be voted on; though 73 employees signed petition to employer complaining of lack of
notice and asking it not to sign contract, employer violated NLRA § 8(a)(5) in refusing to sign
contract).
42. See supra p. 802.
43. For example, in Cheese Barn, 222 N.L.R.B. 418 (1976), enforced, 558 F.2d 526 (9th Cir.
1977), the employer had apparently been indifferent to the whole matter of ratification until the
proposed contract was submitted to its employees and rejected. The union then presented the identical
contract to the employer, who then refused to sign it without its being made subject to successful
ratification. The employer was found to have insisted unlawfully on ratification as a condition of
agreement and was ordered to execute the agreement. The decision follows logically from NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), but something seems to have gone awry.
Since the union intended to, and did, submit the proposed contract to the employees, and announced
this intention during the bargaining process, it would probably have agreed to inclusion of a ratifica-
tion requirement in the contract. The Board's position is that a union's announced intent to submit a
contract to ratification is not the same as including that intent as a contractual term, and that only the
latter may be relied on by the employer to refuse to execute a contract. Cheese Barn, 222 N.L.R.B. at
419; C. & W. Lektra Bat Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1974), enforced, 513 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1975). In
fact, the contract rejected in Cheese Barn actually contained such a clause, inserted by the employer to
conform to what it thought were union desires and assertedly not noticed by the union. 222 N.L.R.B.
at 419. The Board held there had been no agreement on the clause. Id. at 420. Had there been, the
employer could lawfully have refused to sign the agreement and its employees would not have been
obligated to work under an agreement they had rejected.
Perhaps Cheese Barn represents hostility only to the employer's asserting the employee's rights by
proxy rather than to ratification as such. The employer's action seems unobjectionable to me, since the
employer remains bound by good faith. There is some suggestion in Cheese Barn that, following the
employees' rejection of the proposed contract, the employer began insisting on ratification but made no
other concession. This would violate the duty to bargain in good faith, since it indicates a "desire not
to reach an agreement with the union." NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
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ees' rights or of union democracy (let alone any more threatening idea
such as participatory democracy) would make it absurd to insist on em-
ployee voice as "bad faith.""
There is little reason to suppose that any of these rules-ratification
implicated in FMCS mediation, regulation of disputes in a national emer-
gency, NLRB rules on -contract bar, or the duty to bargain-exerts any
great practical effect on labor relations generally or on ratification practice
in particular. Yet their ideological impact cannot be dismissed so easily.
They are powerful statements to the effect that employee ratification is
not "normal"; that it is typically an impediment to blissful contractual
harmony, like a stranger's stepping out from the crowd at the point in the
marriage ceremony when objections are called for; that ratification has a
place in national labor policy only on the rare occasions when employees
are closer to their employer than are union officials. These atti-
tudes-indeed, the cases themselves-have been influential when employ-
ees have sought to enforce directly their right to ratification.
B. Direct Enforcement of Employees' Right To Ratify Agreements
A lawyer is visited by a group of employees. They have, they say, lost
their jobs because of a secret agreement between their local president and
44. There is surprisingly little case law on the related question of the circumstances under which
an unratified agreement is enforceable against a union. In comparison to the numerous suits by em-
ployees claiming violation of their right to ratify the agreement, there are few suits in which defen-
dants resist complying with an agreement on the ground that it was unratified. There is, however, a
clear trend toward regarding ratification as an abnormal part of the contracting process, and hence
toward enforcing unratified agreements. At common law, it was perfectly obvious to courts hearing
actions to enforce collective agreements that unions might give their negotiators as much or as little
authority as they liked. As a result, when employers sued unions for specific performance of a promise
not to strike, and the officers defended on the grounds that they had not been empowered to conclude
an agreement, the courts surveyed the unions' internal documents to determine if ratification was a
condition precedent to agreement. See A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 169 F. 225, 229-41 (6th Cir.
1909) (refusing to enjoin strike because convention ratification unobtained); W.A. Snow Iron Works,
Inc. v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 382, 390-91, 116 N.E. 601, 604 (1917) (officers unauthorized to consent
to employment of nonmembers). LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), which created federal juris-
diction for suits to enforce collective agreements, also provided that actual approval or subsequent
ratification would not be controlling of agency questions, id. § 301(e), 29 U.S.C. § 185(e). "This has
been properly construed as opening the way for application of general rules of agency and particularly
the rules of apparent authority." United Steelworkers v. CCI Corp., 395 F.2d 529, 532 (10th Cir.
1968) (holding union bound by no-strike promise despite absence of approval by international of-
ficers), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1019 (1969).
While unratified agreements are thus enforced against unions on the theory of apparent authority,
e.g., KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Transport Workers' Union, 56 L.R.R.M. 2205 (E.D.N.Y. 1964)
(injunction against strike); 57 L.R.R.M. 2063 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (contempt), there is still some judicial
willingness to examine internal union documents to unravel actual authority. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v.
International Union, UAW, 419 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1969); International Sound Technicians Local
695 v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 611 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding
union approval based on union's internal documents); see also Piggly Wiggly Operators' Warehouse,
Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly Operators' Warehouse Indep. Truck Drivers Union, Local 1, 611 F.2d 580 (5th
Cir. 1980) (upholding arbitrator's determination that provision agreed to by business agent, but not
included in draft submitted to membership for ratification, did not become part of contract).
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their employer, which permitted employees displaced at another establish-
ment to "bump" them. They never heard of this agreement, never got to
vote on it, and would have done all they could to vote it down had it ever
been presented to them. Can the lawyer, they ask, prevent this contract
from going into effect until the employees have a chance to ratify it?
While there are legal theories to help the employees, and while I will
argue that courts should employ these theories in the many cases like this
one, the lawyer's most candid short answer is that he can do little. There
is no legal requirement that contracts be ratified, so unless the union has
violated its own rules or discriminated against these employees, they are
without a remedy. Moreover, no court has ever enjoined an agreement
already in operation, even if unratified by a membership plainly entitled
to do so under applicable union rules. Even if the employees had a right
to ratify the agreement under union rules, then they may at most be able
to obtain money damages for the harm done them.
I will review here the cases that command this modest conclusion. In
Part III, I will criticize the assumptions of those cases and argue for a
greater judicial willingness to require, and supervise, democracy in collec-
tive bargaining.
1. The Limited Statutory Right To Ratify a Contract if the Union
Constitution Is Silent
Perhaps sixty percent of unionized employees have no right under their
union's constitution to vote on collective agreements. 45 As to them, the title
of this section is ironic; they have no general statutory right to see in
advance, to comment or vote on the agreement that governs their working
lives.
This situation has not come about for want of legal theories which
would support such a right of representation. First, there is a respectable
body of opinion that the duty of fair representation, as applied to the
negotiation of collective agreements, imposes on unions requirements of
procedural fairness that include the obligation to ascertain employee inter-
ests and desires, through "rational decisionmaking processes. "46 This ap-
proach to the problem of fair representation in contract negotiations de-
rives from the very case that announced the doctrine, Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville Railroad.47 Steele, of course, did not shy away from review-
ing the union's substantive negotiating position: The case enjoined the
45. Lahne, Union Contract Ratification Procedures, 91 MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1968, at 7, 9
(sample of 73 national union constitutions taken in 1964).
46. The leading article is Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51
r Ex. L. REv. 1119, 1131 (1973).
47. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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union's attempt to eliminate black firemen from the railroad and appro-
priate their jobs for the whites. Yet, the case also contains a number of
references to procedural inadequacies in the union's bargaining activities.
We are specifically told, for example, that the union in Steele served its
demands for the elimination of black firemen "without informing the Ne-
gro firemen or giving them opportunity to be heard"'" though minorities
have a "right to have their interests considered at the conference table.' 9
Finally, wherever necessary to the union's substantive obligation to bar-
gain fairly for all employees, "the union is required to consider requests
of non-union members of the craft and expressions of their views with
respect to collective bargaining with the employer and to give to them
notice of and opportunity for hearing upon its proposed action."5°
These remarks may be most pertinent to the formation of a union's
demands in bargaining. Some courts have held that, in an intraunion con-
flict over bargaining demands, fair representation requires an equitable
procedure for protecting the interests of all affected employees, and that
simply advancing the demands of the most numerous group is not such a
procedure. 1 In the absence of intraunion conflict, however, fair represen-
tation does not seem to require any particular bargaining procedures. In
48. Id. at 195.
49. Id. at 200.
50. Id. at 204. An unusually perceptive scholar has recently discerned that Steele, too, makes an
unexpected assumption of-even a choice for-elitist bargaining:
In holding that unions owe a duty of fair representation to all members of the bargaining unit,
but that the duty does not require unions to allow all bargaining unit employees to become
union members, the Court committed itself to a particular perspective on the questions of
internal union democracy. It is a necessary premise of the Court's holding that it is possible for
a labor organization to provide "fair representation" to employees whom it declines to admit to
union membership or, indeed, to union meetings. That is, the Court believed a union can
adequately fulfill its duties as a bargaining agent without the participation and active involve-
ment of represented employees in the union's decision-making process and without inclusion of
the represented in the leadership cadre who square off against the employer at the bargaining
table.
Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives from La-
bor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. Rzv. 157, 189-90 (1982). I agree with Professor Klare
that the hints about participation in Steele are no substitute for the Supreme Court's full commitment
to democratic bargaining, which would have entailed at a minimum a federal right to union member-
ship. I believe, however, that Congress, in enacting the LMRDA in 1959, did adopt a considerably
more participatory model of union democracy, one which the courts have wilfully failed to apply to
collective bargaining. See infra pp. 834-36.
51. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 315, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 545 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1976);
Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976); see also Waiters Union Local 781 v.
Hotel Ass'n of Wash. D.C., 498 F.2d 998, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (duty of fair representation "im-
plies some consideration of the position of the members involved," but duty not breached where inter-
national officers "were apprised of the position" of one group of members and eventually adopted
position advocated by another group). For a particularly thoughtful recasting of these and other "bar-
gaining procedure" cases in substantive terms, see Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective
Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REv. 183, 198-239 (1980).
These cases, which hold that fair representation may limit the effectiveness of democracy in collec-
tive bargaining, must be reconciled with whatever theory of the right to democratic collective bargain-
ing is put forward. See infra pp. 851-53.
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particular, fair representation does not require that contracts be submitted
to the membership for ratification.5"
Passage of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Lan-
drum-Griffin) Act in 1959 opened up a second source of potential argu-
ments for an inherent employee right to ratify agreements. To be sure, the
Act said nothing by its terms about collective bargaining, but this very
silence was cause for concern to some leading figures of the period who
wanted to make sure that full democracy for dues increases, election of
officers, and internal by-laws did not infect the collective bargaining
process. 53
It is possible to read the Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organiza-
tions" as creating a right to democratic bargaining, including the right to
ratify agreements. Section 101(a)(1) grants union members "equal rights
and privileges . . . to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the
business of [membership] meetings." 55 Elitist bargaining is the antithesis
of equal rights. Bargaining demands and proposed contracts are likely to
be in some fashion the business at meetings, but there can be no equal
right to participate if a few leaders hold all the information and members
do not vote at all. Section 101(a)(2) grants union members the right to
express their views on union business; surely this right is violated if meet-
ings are held but members' views are never solicited.56
Nevertheless, courts have refused to find such a right to ratification.
They have spoken the language of policy and have identified a national
interest in an authoritarian determination of the terms and conditions of
employment.
57
52. Hayden v. RCA Global Communication, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Coleman
v. Tennessee Valley Trades & Lab. Council, 396 F. Supp. 671, 677 (E.D. Tenn. 1975); Aikens v.
Abel, 373 F. Supp. 425, 432-433 (W.D. Pa. 1974); McMullans v. Kansas, 0. & G. Ry., 229 F.2d
50, 56 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 918 (1956); Coleman v. Citrans Corp., 112 L.R.R.M. 3233
(N.D. Cal. 1982); Arnold v. U.S. Indus., Inc., Jane Colby Div., 111 L.R.R.M. 2714, 2718 (W.D.
Va. 1981) ("Unions possess an inherent authority to modify their agreements, even without express
contractual authorization .... No vote of the membership is needed to validate such modifications in
the absence of an express requirement in the agreement, or in the constitution or bylaws of the
union."), aff'd mer., 113 L.R.R.M. 2320 (4th Cir. 1983); Pastrana v. Folding Box, Corrugated Box
& Display Workers Local 381, 212 F. Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The Pastrana case supported this
conclusion by citations to, inter alia, the NLRB's contract bar decisions in Midland Rubber, Texas
Co., and Appalachian Shale (discussed supra notes 30-31).
53. See A. Cox, supra note 21, at 93-94 (1960) (attributing such views to others).
54. LMRDA, tit. I, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1976).
55. LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1976).
56. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976); see infra pp. 855-56.
57. In this sense, the most candid and accurate judicial analysis of the relationship between union
democracy and collective bargaining appears in an early case, which dismissed an employee suit seek-
ing to enjoin witholding of payments into a new pension plan until the plan could be presented to all
locals for a vote allegedly required by the union's constitution:
In brief, the Reporting and Disclosure Act is to secure to union members rights vis-a-vis the
union in order to foster responsible collective bargaining between the union and employers. No
rights were granted to individuals to inject themselves into the collective bargaining procedures
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There is one circumstance in which the LMRDA grants employees a
right of ratification. Section 101(a)(1) guarantees members "equal rights
and privileges. . . to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organi-
zation." 58 Courts have held this section to require as a general matter that
if some union members are afforded the right to ratify, others must also
enjoy that right.59 This doctrine, however, reveals in two ways the linger-
ing fallout from the earlier cases denying the applicability of the
LMRDA to collective bargaining, as well as the present unease about the
policy value of democratic collective bargaining.
First, it does not really hold that employees can ratify.60 Second, be-
or agreements or to litigate the authority of union negotiators or the manner of arriving at a
collective bargaining agreement.
Davis v. Washington State Council of Carpenters, 47 L.R.R.M. 2245, 2247 (W.D. Wash. 1960)
(quoting brief of defendant employers). Lest anyone have any doubt as to what constituted "responsi-
ble collective bargaining," the court had stated a few lines earlier that the LMRDA had to be read in
conjunction with the Taft-Hartley Act's purpose of eliminating industrial strife. None of this lan-
guage was necessary to the holding, which among other grounds rested on the fact that the acts
complained of predated the effective date of the LMRDA.
Other courts have concluded that the LMRDA conveys no independent right to contract ratifica-
tion. See Confederated Indep. Union Local 1 v. Rockwell-Standard Co., 465 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir.
1972); Aikens v. Abel, 373 F. Supp. 425, 433-34 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Horn v. Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street, Elec. Ry., & Motor Coach Employees Div. 1202, 194 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
58. LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1976).
59. American Postal Workers Union, Headquarters Local 6885 v. American Postal Workers
Union, 665 F.2d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1981). This decision is noteworthy as the clearest of the handful of
cases suggesting the applicability of § 101(a)(1) to denials of the right to ratify. See also Trail v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 542 F.2d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 1976) ("We believe the word 'referen-
dum' [in LMRDA § 101(a)(1)] is sufficiently broad to guarantee to all union members a right to vote
on a union contract which any of them enjoy."), on remand, 106 L.R.R.M. 2930 (E.D. Mich. 1980);
Thomas v. United Mine Workers, 422 F. Supp. 1111, 1117 (D.D.C. 1976) (denying union's motion
for summary judgment in suit by retired employees seeking right to ratify agreements, and holding
that exclusion of retirees, when members vote, must be "reasonable" and not in "bad faith"). But see
Cleveland Orchestra Comm. v. Cleveland Fed'n of Musicians Local 4, 303 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1962)
(union permitted to deny orchestra musicians ratification rights, even though it allowed voting on pay
scale governing most union work).
Letting some but not all employees vote to ratify may also violate the duty of fair representation as
contained in NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A), although the contours of the obligation are unclear, in part because
the NLRB accepts the doctrine only when bound by a court of appeals' decision in the precise case
before it. See International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 310 v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1176, 1182 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (reversing Board and holding that unions jointly certified as bargaining representatives violated
NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A) in excluding one union from ratification vote); cf. Branch 6000, Nat'l Ass'n of
Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808, 812-13 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that referendum on bar-
gaining policy, which employer had indicated it would accept, must be extended to voluntary non-
members of union but distinguishing prenegotiation referendum from contract ratification); Lodge 10,
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 257 N.L.R.B. 587 (1981) (vote on work schedules limited to union mem-
bers violates NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A)); see also American Postal Workers Union, Headquarters Local
6885 v. American Postal Workers Union, 113 L.R.R.M. 2433 (D.D.C. 1982) (fair representation
requires extending ratification vote to voluntary nonmembers). But see Manufacturing Workers Local
652, 237 N.L.R.B. 442 (1978) (in contract ratification vote conducted in part through visits to work
sites, avoiding work crew of a "vociferous opponent of both the union hierarchy and the contract"
does not violate § 8(b)(1)(A) since ratification "strictly an internal union matter").
60. Most important, of course, the union may choose not to submit the contract for ratification to
any members, thus treating them equally (if poorly).
In addition, the cases allow unions to exclude some members from the ratification vote even if
others are eligible. Although the court in Postal Workers reversed the lower court's summary judg-
Collective Bargaining
cause the courts have not granted a remedy against the employer, the doc-
trine leaves the unratified agreement intact."1 Plaintiffs are apparently
limited to injunctive and declaratory relief against the union and compen-
satory relief. It is the rare plaintiff who is in a position to show with any
certainty the financial loss from the denial of her right to ratification,62
even though there seems little doubt that an average unratified agreement
ment for the defendant union, it did not grant summary judgment to the plaintiff local denied the
right to ratify but rather "remanded for fuller consideration of the local's allegations and the union's
defenses," 665 F.2d at 1104-05. The union was thus apparently given a chance to show that its
discrimination among locals constituted one of the "reasonable rules and regulations" protected by §
101(a)(1), though the standard for such a showing was not discussed by the court. Compare 665 F.2d
at 1103 (citing with approval cases permitting unions to limit votes to active members, those in good
standing, or those affected by action) with id. at 1104 (noting none of exceptions was relevant to case
at hand). One judge on the panel was bewildered by the remand. See id. at 1110-11 (Nichols, J.,
concurring and dissenting). On remand, the union did not seriously challenge the local's right to
ratify; the litigated issue was whether non-members could also vote; the court held that they had a
right to do so. American Postal Workers Union, Headquarters Local 6885 v. American Postal Work-
ers Union, 113 L.R.R.M. 2433 (D.D.C. 1982).
Under Thomas, exclusion of retired employees would be permissible if performed in good faith. See
Thomas v. United Mine Workers, 422 F. Supp. at 1117.
61. The employer owes employees neither a duty of fair representation, nor equal voting rights,
nor any fiduciary or contractual obligations under the union constitution. See Wages v. Honeywell,
Inc., 66 L.R.R.M. 2766 (D. Minn. 1967) (allegations of improper ratification dismissed as to em-
ployer). Yet plaintiffs seeking to enjoin operation of the unratified collective agreement may face the
practical and legal objection that the employer is an indispensible party. See Case v. IBEW Local
1547, 438 F. Supp. 856, 859-860 (D. Alaska 1977) (dismissing claim for injunction against collective
agreement due to lack of jurisdiction over employers' organization), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Stelling v. IBEW Local 1547, 587 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (19.79). And
if the employer is found at any time to be an indispensible party, the entire action may be dismissed.
3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRArICE 19.19 (1979); cf. Curtis v. United Transp. Union, 486 F. Supp.
966 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (court rejoined previously dismissed defendant in case involving duty of fair
representation); Barrett v. Thorofare Mkts. Inc., 77 F.R.D. 22 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (dismissing claim
alleging denial of fair representation in negotiating plan that denied plaintiffs' pensions on early re-
tirement because pension plan's trustees were indispensible party); Johnson v. Colts, Inc., 306 F.
Supp. 1076, 1079-80 (D. Conn. 1969) (refusing to dismiss employee's suit against employer on collec-
tive agreement for failure to join union; court ordered such joinder).
It would seem prudent, therefore, for plaintiffs to attempt to sue the employer as well as the union.
One form of such an action alleges a conspiracy between the employer and the union officials to
execute the contract without ratification. See Godowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 759
(3d Cir. 1977). But see Trail v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 542 F.2d 961, 964 n.1 (6th Cir.
1976) (dismissing suit against employers' association despite allegation of conspiracy by employers
and union). Another tack for plaintiffs would be to name employers as parties whose absence would
make complete relief unavailable. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(1). This may be done even if there is no
cause of action against the employer. Burman v. Trans World Airlines, 570 F. Supp. 1303, 1309 n.5
(N.D. Ill. 1983); Barninger v. National Maritime Union, 349 F. Supp. 803, 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Contra American Postal Workers Union, Headquarters Local 6885 v. American Postal Workers
Union, 665 F.2d 1096, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
62. In Postal Workers, however, the plaintiffs were able to allege pecuniary loss under the unrati-
fied agreement.
As regards the money damages, the plaintiffs seem to contend that they would have been better
off in a pecuniary way if no agreement had been negotiated, in view of the normal Civil
Service and Post Office regulations that would have applied. They say they lost some 'merit
increases' and 'saved grade' positions.
American Postal Workers Union, Headquarters Local 6885 v. American Postal Workers Union, 665
F.2d 1096, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting).
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would be inferior to ratified agreements concluded by the same parties.63
In the individual case, however, how many employees could prove that,
even if ratification had been observed, the eventual agreement would have
differed from the one that union officials concluded?
In summary, then, for the sixty percent or so of unionized employees
whose union constitutions do not grant them the right to ratify agree-
ments, no court will generally require ratification. Even employees whose
fellow union members are permitted something sufficiently close to ratifi-
cation to permit a finding of denial of equal rights may not receive an
injunction against the unratified agreement, and thus may go remediless
unless they can demonstrate pecuniary loss from the failure to ratify the
agreement.
2. Enforcing the Union Constitution on Ratification
It is perhaps not too surprising that courts have refused to order ratifi-
cation where not otherwise required by the union's constitution, since this
might seem to be an inappropriate intrusion into internal union political
decisions. Indeed, a frequent theme of the cases refusing to do so is that
ratification is a matter between the union and its members."'
Suppose, however, that the union's constitution does require ratification
of proposed agreements. And suppose that union officials conclude an
63. Judge Nichols explained:
It appears to me that the union officials who negotiated the contract placed themselves in a
conflict of interests position by simultaneously negotiating with the same management some
contracts that required ratification, and some that by their view did not. They would be under
a strong temptation to make the inevitable concessions to management in the contracts not to
be ratified, and obtain the plums in those that were to be.
Id.
64. See, e.g., Cleveland Orchestra Comm. v. Cleveland Fed'n of Musicians Local 4, 303 F.2d 229,
233 (6th Cir. 1962); Aikens v. Abel, 373 F. Supp. 425, 435 (W.D. Pa. 1974). In Aikens, plaintiffs,
members of the United Steelworkers of America, sought the right to ratify the famous Experimental
Negotiating Agreement (ENA) of 1973, in which the union gave up the right to strike over unresolved
new contract issues and agreed to binding interest arbitration, in exchange for a payment of $150 to
each member and certain other benefits. The court rejected "the unspoken promise [sic] behind [plain-
tiffs'] thinking. . . that a union's legally recognized right to strike is so important, so hard-won, that
no one, not even the union's representative leadership nor even, presumably, the membership them-
selves, can give it up." 373 F. Supp. at 437.
The Court was undoubtedly aware that membership ratification is a continuing political issue in
the Steelworkers, with support for ratification concentrated among the union's younger and black
members. See 99 LAB. REL. RE . (BNA) 62 (Sept. 25, 1978). Such a proposal is voted down at
almost every biennial convention of the union, most recently in the fall of 1982. USW Rejection of
Changes to Bargaining, Dues Structure, 111 LAB. RE. REP. (BNA) 96 (Oct. 4, 1982). For an
analysis of the unresponsiveness of USW conventions to the rank and file and their near-total domina-
tion by paid union staff, see J. HERLING, RIGHT TO CHALLENGE: PEOPLE AND PoLrIcs IN THE
STEELWORKERS UNION 360-361, 401 (1972); L. ULMAN, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STEELWORK-
ERS UNION 99-117 (1982). Under these circumstances, judicial support for contract ratification by
steelworkers would be less an intrusion into ongoing union politics than a vindication of union democ-
racy over staff oligarchy.
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agreement without notice to, or perhaps over the objection of, employees.
What can the employees do?
A well-pleaded employees' suit, alleging a failure to submit a proposed
contract for ratification as required by the union's constitution, might al-
lege any or all of five causes of action, each of which has been accepted by
one or more of the circuit courts of appeal in the last five years:
1. The failure to submit to ratification is a violation of the equal
rights provision of the Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organi-
zations, LMRDA § 101(a)(1).
6 5
2. The failure is a breach of the duty of fair representation. 6
3. The failure is a violation of the fiduciary obligation of union
officers under LMRDA § 501. 6
4. The failure is a breach of the union's constitution, which is a
contract between labor organizations and between the leadership and
the membership, and hence federal jurisdiction exists either under
LMRDA § 301(a) for suits to enforce contracts between labor orga-
65. Christopher v. Safeway Stores, 644 F.2d 467, 468-71 (5th Cir. 1981); Trail v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 542 F.2d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 1976). Contra Alexander v. International Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 624 F.2d 1235, 1239-40 (5th Cir. 1980). This theory is most obviously applicable
when, as in Trail, plaintiffs allege that other members of the union have been permitted to vote on
agreements. See Alexander, 624 F.2d at 1241 (Clark, J., dissenting in part). The Christopher case
does not require such an allegation, however, and expressly rejected "the Union's contention that if all
members are equally denied the right to vote there is no statutory breach . . . ." 644 F.2d at 470.
What the Christopher court seemed to be groping for, and could profitably have cited, was the line
of cases invoking the union's constitution as the definition of equal rights, which essentially recognized
jurisdiction under LMRDA § 101(a)(1) to remedy most breaches by unions of their own by-laws,
even if all members are equally deprived of their constitutional entitlements. Bunz v. Moving Picture
Mach. Operators' Protective Union Local 224, 567 F.2d 1117, 1121-22 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (denying
that § 101(a)(1) is violated "every time a union breaks its rules," but finding violation in approving
picket assessment with a 59% majority despite by-laws requiring approval of assessments by two-
thirds vote); Miller v. Utility Constr. Union, 89 L.R.R.M. 2897, 2899 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Young v.
Hayes, 195 F. Supp. 911, 916-17 (D.D.C. 1961); see infra note 86.
66. Alexander v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 624 F.2d 1235, 1240-41 (5th Cir.
1980); Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 758-61 (3d Cir. 1977); Trail v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 542 F.2d 961, 968 (6th Cir. 1976). Alexander involved an actual finding
that:
A local union's business agent, apparently on direction from the international union's presi-
dent, signed a binding project agreement on behalf of the local, even though the local's mem-
bership had unanimously declined on two prior occasions to participate in the project, and
despite the presence of a provision in the parent union's constitution that collective bargaining
agreements must be approved by a majority of the affected local . ...
624 F.2d at 1236. This was held to constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation. Such
"business agent concessions" are common. See infra note 160.
67. Stelling v. IBEW Local 1547, 587 F.2d 1379, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
944 (1979).
While so far only the Ninth Circuit has held that a failure of union officers to submit a contract for
ratification in violation of their constitution is a breach of fiduciary obligation under LMRDA §
501(a), three circuits have now held that the statutory provision reaches beyond purely financial obli-
gations. Stelling, 587 F.2d 1379; Sabolsky v. Budzanowski, 457 F.2d 1245, 1250-51 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972); Johnson v. Nelson, 325 F.2d 646, 649 (8th Cir. 1963). Contra Gurton
v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1964).
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nizations, or as a state law claim pendent to the three federal claims
above."8
5. The last ratified agreement must be enforced on the theory
that it remains unsupplanted pending ratification of a new
agreement. 69
Despite judicial acceptance of these causes of action, 0 only two cases
have ordered any relief for employees deprived of their right to ratify, and
only one awarded more than nominal damages.71 Moreover, no court of
68. Since plaintiffs must allege that the union constitution grants them the right to ratify, can they
just sue the union and officers directly for breach of the constitution, under LMRA § 301(a) which
creates federal jurisdiction for suits for violation of "contract ... between labor organizations"? A
number of the cases cited reject this view, for one of two reasons. The first is the once-popular theory
that § 301(a) jurisdiction to enforce union constitutions extends only to intra-union disputes accompa-
nied by "concrete allegations of actual threats to industrial peace. . . ." 1199 D.C. Nat'l Union of
Hosp. & Health Care Employees v. National Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 533 F.2d
1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1976),followed in Stelling, 587 F.2d at 1383-84. The second denies standing
under § 301(a) to individual employees. Svacek v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 400, 431 F.
2d 705 (9th Cir. 1970),followed in Stelling, 587 F.2d at 1383-84; Trail, 542 F.2d at 967-68.
Recently the Supreme Court rejected the 1199 D.C. holding in United Ass'n of Journeymen &
Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615 (1981), while reserving
judgment on Svacek, 452 U.S. at 627 n.16. Thus, as of early 1984, it is clear that suits on a union
constitution may be brought in federal court without alleging threats to industrial peace, but it re-
mains an open issue whether individual employees may bring such a suit. But see Kinney v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 669 F.2d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 1982) (such suits held to be permitted,
following Plumbers).
One court has suggested that federal jurisdiction exists under LMRA § 301(a) for any suit seeking
to enjoin or contest the validity of, as well as to enforce, a collective agreement. Petroff v. Teamsters
Local 614, 96 L.R.R.M. 3410, 3412 (E.D. Mich. 1977). Contra NDK Corp. v. Local 1550, United
Food & Commercial Workers, 113 L.R.R.M. 3098, 3099 (7th Cir. 1983); Leskiw v. Local 1470,
IBEW, 464 F.2d 721, 722-23 (3d Cir. 1972) (following Adams v. Budd Co., 349 F.2d 368, 369-370
(3d Cir. 1965)); Hernandez v. National Packing Co., 455 F.2d 1252, 1253 (1st Cir. 1972). The
grounds of jurisdiction in Walters v. Teamsters Local 612, 70 L.R.R.M. 3252 (N.D. Ala. 1965),
aff'd, 425 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1970), are unclear.
As applied to the problem of a contract unratified in breach of a union's constitution, the entire
focus on § 301(a) has always seemed incomprehensible to me. Federal jurisdiction now plainly exists
in such suits by alleging the union's breach of the constitution as a violation of LMRDA § 101(a), the
duty of fair representation, and the fiduciary obligations of LMRDA § 501(a). At that point, the
breach of constitution claim is properly in federal court as a pendent state law claim. As the Supreme
Court has had occasion to note, most states treat the union's constitution as a contract between all the
members and the organization. United Ass'n ofJourne)rnen, 452 U.S. at 621-22; International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 618-19 (1958). I do not understand why breach of the
union's constitution was not argued, as a pendent state claim, in any of these cases.
69. Province v. Cleveland Press Publishing Co., 571 F. Supp. 855, 860-61 (N.D. Ohio 1983);
Arnold v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 102 L.R.R.M. 2408 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (union breach of
fair representation in failing to process grievance filed under old ratified agreement).
70. All five theories derive the standard for ratification from the union's constitution. This gives
less protection than would reliance on equal rights, fair representation, or fiduciary obligations alone.
When union leaders refuse to apply constitutional ratification procedures, courts sometimes defer to
these strained constitutional interpretations under a deferential "reasonableness" standard. Stelling,
587 F.2d at 1388-89; United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 117 v. Albany Dist. Council of Carpenters,
553 F. Supp. 55, 59-61 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
71. Christopher v. Safeway Stores, 644 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1981), represents the only award of
other than nominal damages to employees deprived of the right to approve their contract. The plain-
tiffs were two individuals laid off in the closing of one store and unable to bump less senior employees
in the district since, unbeknownst to the membership, the union and employer had, in the last con-
tract, substituted a smaller seniority unit and concealed this fact from the membership. This action by
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appeals has as yet enjoined an agreement from going into effect until rati-
fied by the membership."2
It would be inappropriate to draw from this small body of federal cases
extending jurisdiction the general principle that employees cannot enforce
their right to ratify under the union constitution or by-laws. Before 1976
there were no such cases at all.73 Nevertheless, one can be a bit skeptical
of the often-repeated assertion that the right to ratify agreements is a mat-
the union was found to have violated the equal rights provision of LMRDA § 101(a)(1), see supra
note 65, and a jury award of lost wages to the two men, plus the district court's award of attorney's
fees, were affirmed. In Alexander v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 624 F.2d 1235,
1240-41 (5th Cir. 1980), both the local and the international were found derelict in fair representa-
tion but only nominal damages were awarded. The district court found, in an unreported opinion,
that none of the plaintiffs was able to show compensable damages, and this finding was not appealed.
Id. at 1240. Injunctive relief against the illegal agreement was rendered moot on the completion of the
project. Id. at 1237. Under the fair representation theory adopted by the court, punitive damages are
apparently unavailable under IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
72. I have been able to locate only three injunctions issued against the enforcement of a collective
agreement pending membership ratification as required by the union constitution. All were in the
federal district courts, and none of the cases was officially reported.
On November 26, 1977, Judge Frankel enjoined the New York City Taxi Drivers' Union from
entering into a collective agreement until it had been ratified by the membership. Taxi Rank-and-File
Coalition v. Van Arsdale, 86 L.R.R.M. 2359 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The plaintiffs had alleged a variety of
Landrum-Griffin complaints which were not specified in Judge Frankel's oral opinion and further
alleged a right to a ratification vote under the union constitution. They also proved that the last
agreement between the union and the Metropolitan Taxi Board of Trade, Inc. had never been sub-
mitted to the membership at a ratification meeting. Judge Frankel's opinion is hurried; apparently
execution of a new collective agreement was imminent, and his injunction issued without much time
for refinement and without appearances by either the union or the Board of Trade. The preliminary
injunction is nonetheless quite detailed as to the ratification process which must be followed.
Some four months later, further injunctive relief was granted upon an allegation that a ratification
meeting had been called on terms which contravened the preliminary injunction, i.e., including owner-
drivers not covered by the proposed contract and without adequate notice of the issues before the
meeting. The proposed meeting was enjoined. Taxi Rank-and-File Coalition v. Van Arsdale, 86
L.R.R.M. 2362 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). This second injunction is one of only two injunctions which I have
been able to locate issued against the holding of an improperly constituted.ratification meeting. The
other is Committee of Concerned Transit Workers v. Transport Workers Union, 78-Civ.-1853
(S.D.N.Y., April 24, 1978) (discussed infra note 87). It is quite possible that Judge Frankel was
unaware at the time of these injunctions how unprecedented they were.
The second injunction forbade the Amalgamated Transit Union "from entering into a collective
bargaining agreement unless a majority of the voting members have voted to accept this offer." The
officers' contention that a two-thirds vote was necessary to reject a tentative settlement and strike was
rejected as contrary to the "plain language" of the ATU Constitution. The defendants were ordered to
disregard the erroneous "two-thirds" requirement and were further ordered to submit the most recent
company offer to the membership "accompanied by an explanation of the consequences of that vote in
accordance with the foregoing provisions of this order." Local 1202, Amalgamated Transit Union v.
Amalgamated Transit Union, No. 80-3305 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 1981) (Gasch, J.).
In the third case, Addy v. Newspaper & Periodical Drivers Local 921, No. C-83-5435-WHO
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1983) (Orrick, J.), the court declared invalid a mail-in ratification which contra-
vened union by-laws and past practice requiring a meeting, relying on LMRDA § 101(a)(1) to en-
force the union constitution.
73. The cases supra notes 64-65 supersede a line of earlier cases dismissing, generally on jurisdic-
tional grounds, plaintiffs' claims that failures to ratify violated the union's constitution or by-laws.
See, e.g., Werk v. Armco Steel Corp., 92 L.R.R.M. 3393 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Branch v. Vickers, Inc.,
209 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
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ter best left to employees and their union, 4 since if the union breaches
that obligation in all likelihood nothing will happen to it. By hypothesis,
employees deprived of the right to ratify their contract are frequently una-
ware of its wording and impact until long after the business agent and
management have implemented it. The resulting situation puts plaintiffs
in the unpleasant bind of either seeking to enjoin a functioning agreement
with nothing to put in its place, or arguing for damages based on the
difference, generally impossible to demonstrate, between the secret agree-
ment and a hypothetical ratified agreement. 5
Before the remedy of nominal damages is graven in stone, I would sug-
gest that courts retain a willingness to award relief when a collective
agreement is concluded, in violation of union rules, behind the backs of
employees. Certainly employees who suffer financial loss under the agree-
ment should be awarded compensatory damages without having to show
the impossible, namely the contents of the likely agreement after a lawful
ratification process." The denial of the right to democratic participation
in one's affairs is worth something, and damages for its deprivation are
simply compensatory. 77 Where plaintiffs proceed under fiduciary and
equal rights theories, punitive damages may be appropriate in particularly
outrageous subversions of democracy, as when union officials collude with
the employer or feather their own nests. 8
Finally, courts should temporarily enjoin the operation of unratified
collective agreements pending a judicially supervised, orderly ratification
process. This brings us to our next topic: the courts' curious reluctance to
require the same degree of fairness in ratification votes that they require
in other internal union referenda under the LMRDA.
3. Supervising the Ratification Process: Must Ballots Be Meaningful?
When a proposed contract is submitted to the rank and file for ratifica-
tion, the judicial role is not at an end. Federal courts have developed a
74. See supra note 64.
75. See, e.g., Christopher v. Safeway Stores, 644 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1981); Alexander v. Interna-
tional Union of Operating Eng'rs, 624 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980).
76. The Christopher court awarded plaintiffs damages based on the last ratified agreement. This
provides relief only where the unratified agreement gives away a benefit already enjoyed, but does
nothing where the lack of ratification results in an unchanged agreement or one with modest
improvements.
77. But see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (nominal damages for deprivation of constitu-
tional right).
78. Several courts have held that punitive damages are available under LMRDA against union
officials who act maliciously or with wanton indifference to employees' rights. See Bise v. IBEW
Local 1969, 618 F.2d 1299, 1305-06 (5th Cir. 1979); Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 544
F.2d 19, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1976); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193,
199-201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); Maxwell v. UAW Local 1306, 489 F. Supp.
745, 753 (C.D. I1l. 1980).
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substantial body of law guaranteeing that the electorate be informed ade-
quately of alternatives, not be misled by the ballot or accompanying infor-
mation, and be able to organize effective opposition. Nothing illustrates
more clearly the current denigration of democracy in collective bargaining
than the refusal of the courts to apply this body of law to ratification.
In cases involving the adoption of a union constitution or by-laws,
mergers of locals, assessments, and other balloting, the general principle
has emerged that the LMRDA's guarantee of "equal rights and privileges
.. .to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization. . . and
to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of [mem-
bership] meetings"'71 involves more than the "mere naked right to cast a
ballot."80 The right 'to vote must be "meaningful."8 " Accordingly, the fed-
eral courts have not hesitated to supervise internal union referenda. Bal-
lots must be clear and nonmanipulative 2 The electorate must be in-
formed adequately about the proposal under consideration and
alternatives to it.8 Insurgent groups must be permitted to circulate oppos-
ing information as a vindication of their right of free speech." Voting
constituencies must not be gerrymandered; all those affected must vote and
those unaffected may not. 5 Other provisions of the union's constitution
and by-laws applicable to referenda must be followed."
79. LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1976).
80. Young v. Hayes, 195 F. Supp. 911, 916 (D.D.C. 1961).
81. Blanchard v. Johnson, 388 F. Supp. 208, 213 (N.D. Ohio 1975), aff'd in relevant part, 532
F.2d 1074 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
82. Id. at 215 (referendum proposal that local affiliate with particular national union invalid
where local members were not informed of alternate proposals by other national unions); Young v.
Hayes, 195 F. Supp. at 917-18 (improper to require members to cast single "yes or no" vote on
multiple proposals).
83. Blanchard, 388 F. Supp. at 214 (affiliation proposal omitting statement of degree of control
international would have over local held invalid; court ordered full disclosure and dissident access to
union mailing list); Young v. Hayes, 195 F. Supp. at 913, 916 (adoption of amendments to union
constitution invalid where accompanying literature falsely claimed that changes were "made
mandatory through the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act").
84. Lodge 1380, Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 819, 827-29 (9th Cir.
1980) (claim that international's denial of membership lists to locals seeking to generate support for
referendum on constitutional change states cause of action under LMRDA § 101(a)(2)); Sheldon v.
O'Callaghan, 497 F.2d 1276, 1282-83 (2d Cir.) (invalidating referendum on new constitution where
opponents had been denied access to union newspaper and mailing list), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1090
(1974).
85. Alvey v. General Elec. Co., 622 F.2d 1279, 1287 (7th Cir. 1980) (improper to exclude laid-off
members from vote on revised seniority rules); Turner v. Dempster, 569 F. Supp. 683, 689-91 (N.D.
Cal. 1983) (union may not limit important votes to those with more than six years' service); Vestal v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 245 F. Supp. 623 (M.D. Tenn. 1965) (union must permit all af-
fected members to vote on separate charter for one craft group).
86. Bunz v. Moving Picture Mach. Operators' Protective Union Local 224, 567 F.2d 1117 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Miller v. Utility Constr. Union, 89 L.R.R.M. 2897 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Stettner v. Interna-
tional Printing Pressmen, 278 F. Supp. 675 (E.D. Tenn. 1967). But see Yanity v. Benware, 376 F.2d
197 (2d Cir. 1967).
The reliance of most of these cases on the "equal rights" guarantee of LMRDA § 101(a)(1) is odd,
since in each case all members were probably equally confused or misled by the fuzzy ballot wording
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When the union's officers submit a contract for ratification, however,
these principles tend to be forgotten. Courts have repeatedly turned a deaf
ear to claims that ratification districts have been gerrymandered to include
heavy participation by workers unaffected by the agreement.8 7 There has
or accompanying misinformation. Clyde Summers has suggested that the "equal rights" being vindi-
cated are those of the membership, as a class, as against those of the leadership which frames the
issues, dispenses the misinformation, and restrains competing viewpoints. C. SUMMERS, H. WELLING-
TON & A. HYDE, supra note 24, at 1249. This theory receives support in Lodge 1380, Bhd. of Ry.,
Airline & S.S. Clerks v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1980). The denial of membership lists to the
insurgent locals in that case did not violate "equal rights" under LMRDA § 101(a)(1) because the
international leadership remained passive with respect to the proposed referendum. Id. at 826. This
expansive reading of LMRDA § 101(a)(1) as creating rights in the membership equal to those of the
leaders meets the Supreme Court's admonition that the section be understood as an antidiscrimination
provision. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 139 (1964); cf. Atleson, A Union Member's Right of Free
Speech and Assembly: Institutional Interests and Individual Rights, 51 MINN. L. REv. 403, 409-22
(1967) (discussing tension between conceptions of LMRDA § 101(a)(1) as provision creating substan-
tive rights and as antidiscrimination provision permitting equal denial of democratic procedures).
87. At the time of the passage of the LMRDA, Professor Cox disingenuously expressed concern
that the "equal rights" provision of § 101(a)(1) would lead to judicially mandated inclusion of work-
ers unaffected by the contract in ratification votes. Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions under the
Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REv. 819, 832 (1960). In fact, § 101 (a)(1) offers the only
promise of eliminating this extremely common practice-a promise the courts have not kept.
The issue has arisen repeatedly in the Teamsters Union. The union negotiates a National Master
Freight Agreement along with 32 area supplements or riders. The entire package is then submitted to
the national membership and voted up or down. Only if the entire package is rejected nation-
ally-which has never happened, due in part to the requirement under the Teamsters' Constitution
that contracts are considered ratified unless two-thirds of the members vote no-may any portion of it
be renegotiated. Thus, it is by no means uncommon for a substantial majority of the only workers
affected by a particular area supplement to reject it, only to be bound by the supplement because of
national approval of the entire package. Despite the easy step from the equal rights cases to the
conclusion that the package system deprives the affected rank-and-file of any equal rights with the
leadership (or even with members in larger election districts)-let alone any sort of "meaningful
ballot"-federal district courts have on three occasions upheld this system as consistent with "equal
rights," Trail v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 106 L.R.R.M. 2930 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Davey v.
Fitzsimmons, 413 F. Supp. 670 (D.D.C. 1976); Highway Truck Drivers Local 107 v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 65 L.R.R.M. 2265 (D.D.C. 1967).
International displacement of a local's ratification power was also upheld in International Sound
Technicians Local 695, 234 N.L.R.B. 811, 811 (1978) (local is "intermeddler" with "no role to play
in" collective bargaining). The local's refusal to sign the international's agreement, despite the rejec-
tion of that agrement by the affected employees, was held to be contempt of court. International Sound
Technicians Local 655 v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 611 F.2d 266 (9th
Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Note again the assumption that ratification is deviant; that depriving em-
ployees of ratification presents no serious issues of fair representation or equal rights; but that the
employees, seeking a voice in their working conditions, are "intermeddlers" in their own lives.
A glimmer of judicial supervision terhporarily attended the increasingly bizarre efforts of Transport
Workers Union Local 100, which represents subway workers and bus employees in New York City,
to pad the ratification voting rolls with employees unaffected by the relevant contract. In one of ap-
parently only four recorded injunctions against a defective ratification vote, a federal court enjoined a
contract ratification under a ballot which, departing from previous practice, went to employees of five
private bus companies along with public employees. Committee of Concerned Transit Workers v.
Transport Workers Union of America, 78-Civ.-1853 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1978); U.S. Judge Holds Up
Count of T.W.U. Vote on the New Transit Contract, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1978, at A28, col. xx;
Transit Union Voids Vote on Pact; New Balloting Will Be Supervised, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1978, at
Al, col. xx. For the other injunctions, see supra note 72.
Judicial supervision was only a stopgap, however. A subsequent ratification referendum excluded
the employees of the private bus companies, but lumped together employees of two separate public
employers with two separate contracts, the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) and the
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been some willingness to require that misleading ballot propositions be
corrected. 8 The problem of misleading ratification, however, is not gener-
ally on the ballot, but in the accompanying information or misinforma-
tion.89 Here, despite agreement with the abstract proposition that misin-
formation in the contract ratification process may deny workers fair
representation,9" courts have provided no significant relief for workers vic-
timized by such misrepresentation into ratifying contracts not in their in-
terests.91 The simple expedient of delaying the vote pending adequate in-
Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (MABSTOA). NYCTA employees re-
jected their contract by a vote of 8,506 for to 10,825 against; MABSTOA employees approved theirs
3,214 for to 577 against. The union lumped both together and held both contracts ratified. This was
held not to violate the equal rights provisions of LMRDA § 101(a)(1), despite provisions in the
union's constitution and by-laws requiring ratification of contracts "by the members covered" or "by
the majority of the members voting in the Branch affected." The union could without formal amend-
ment interpret its constitution, which designated NYCTA and MABSTOA as separate branches, to
make the two into one branch after the formerly private lines had been publicly taken over and
merged. Nor were equal rights denied since all NYCTA and MABSTOA members counted equally.
Black v. Transp. Workers Union, 454 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd memn., 594 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.
1978).
The TWU leadership's strained readings of the Local 100 constitution have received continued
judicial deference. See Blair v. Local 100, Transport Workers Union, 106 Misc. 2d 1018, 436
N.Y.S.2d 912 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (evenly divided Executive Board held to have approved contract, per-
mitting membership ratification).
88. Sertic v. Cuyahoga, Lake, Geauga, & Ashtabula Counties Carpenters Dist. Council, 423 F.2d
515 (6th Cir. 1970) (impermissible under LMRDA § 101(a)(3) to tie wage increase to dues increase
in bargaining policy referendum). While the court relied on cases under other sections of the
LMRDA, the relevance of Sertic to ratification votes, or bargaining policy referenda, unrelated to
dues is unclear.
In Committee of Concerned Transit Workers v. Transport Workers Union, 78-Civ.-1853
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1978), plaintiffs had objected to a ratification ballot limited to two choices: "I
accept" or "I reject and vote to strike." Plaintiffs maintained that this ballot might intimidate mem-
bers dissatisfied with the contract into ratifying it.
Soto v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 466 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), refused
to enjoin the tallying of votes ratifying a "somewhat misleading" proposal, phrased in "arcane" terms.
The court said: "Plaintiffs' remedy is political. If a majority of the union membership is not satisfied
with the compensation of the elected officers and representatives, it may make its wishes known in the
next election held for such positions." Id. at 1300-01.
89. See infra pp. 840-43. Information is critical because union members often vote to ratify or
reject on the basis of a short summary sheet and oral explanations by union officials. See Christopher
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 644 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1981). Courts have refused to require unions to
distribute the complete text. See Gilliam v. Independent Steelworkers Union, 572 F. Supp. 168 (N.D.
W. Va. 1983) (distinguishing cases, cited supra notes 83-84, that require full disclosure of complete
texts in other referenda subject to LMRDA).
90. Anderson v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 641 F.2d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1981); Deboles v.
Trans World Airlines, 552 F.2d 1005, 1018-20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977). Contra
Bowlin v. UAW, 77 L.R.R.M. 2909 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
91. In Anderson, the union's staff representative who negotiated successive agreements assured
employees at ratification meetings "that a special security fund existed which guaranteed that sever-
ance pay would be available if needed." 641 F.2d at 576. No such fund existed, and the staff repre-
sentative admitted that he was aware of this fact. When the company went bankrupt, employees
received only a portion of their anticipated severance pay. Nonetheless, the court reversed a jury
verdict against the union for the amount of the shortfall because the plaintiffs could not show that
their injuries would not have occurred "but for" the representative's lie. Id. at 579-80. Had the
employees known the truth about the missing security fund, what else would they have done? It was
conjectural, the court argued, whether employees would have struck over severance-pay funding and
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formation from the other side has found no favor. 2 Indeed, it is not clear
what rights opponents of ratification have to get their views to the
membership.93
equally conjectural whether such a strike would have induced the employer to fund the obligation it
undertook: "Even though the plaintiffs' testimony is that [the staff representative] would suppress
such inquiries by shouting at questioners and telling them 'to shut up because the money was there,' it
cannot be said that but for [his] statements the severance pay would have been paid." Id. at 580.
In contrast to Anderson, Deboles probably does present a situation where the employees were un-
questionably lied to but were probably not hurt by the lies. The union official misrepresented the
degree of union insistence on a clause that had been sought unsuccessfully in past negotiations. By
contrast, the union in Anderson misrepresented not its own efforts, but the actual existence of the
benefits it asked employees to approve.
One possibility when employees are misled during the ratification process is to claim that, due to
the misstatements, there was no ratification at all. Something like this happened in Christopher v.
Safeway Stores, 644 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1981), treated by the court as a case of employees altogether
deprived of their right to ratify. In fact a "contract" of sorts had been submitted. This consisted, as is
common, of a single sheet of paper listing the purported changes from the predecessor agreement. As
may or may not be typical, the sheet lied: It omitted any reference to the change from district to city
seniority. This "ratification" was legally insufficient to deprive plaintiffs of their district-wide bump-
ing rights.
In Warehouse Union Local 860 v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1022, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court held it
a breach of the duty of fair representation for a union to fail to inform employees of the employer's
threats to eliminate their jobs if requested wage increases were granted. The record revealed strong
union hostility toward, if not sexist bias against, the affected employees. It is difficult to reconcile the
asserted union obligation to pass on the employer's threats with the absence of any obligation to
distribute the text of the very agreement negotiated, accurate information concerning the contents of
the agreement, or the union's negotiating positions.
Where the misrepresentation results in the ratification of an illegal (because discriminatory) con-
tract, back pay has been awarded. Farmer v. Hotel Workers, Local 1064, 99 L.R.R.M. 2166, 2188
(E.D. Mich. 1978).
92. The choice is between keeping the unratified agreement in effect pending a vote or granting
no relief at all. Compare Parker v. Local 413, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 501 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ohio
1980) (after considering "all the circumstances," court held that union's "approving" modification of
contract to permit flexible work week at meetings called with inadequate notice and from which some
employees were excluded, violated fair representation; court ordered rerun but refused to enjoin en-
forcement of agreement), aff'd mein., 657 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1981) with Baker v. Newspaper &
Graphic Communications Union, Local 6, 628 F.2d 156, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (union does not violate
LMRDA §§ 101(a)(1) and (2) in permitting general discussion and vote on contract without separate
vote on disputed seniority item) and Soto v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 466 F.
Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (refusing to enjoin tabulation of ratification votes of members at sea
despite shorter referendum period than union constitution provided for election of officers, which
plaintiffs claimed inhibited opposition to contract). The contract modification in Parker was voted
down at the rerun election ordered by the court.
93. The NLRB normally holds opposition to contract ratification to be protected by NLRA § 7,
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), and thus protected from employer retaliation under NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). London Chop House, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 111 L.R.R.M. 1302
(1982); Red Cab, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 279 (1971); Aerodex, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964). But cf
Danielson v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 70 L.R.R.M. 2487 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (enjoining
union from recommending rejection of contract because it had not been ratified elsewhere, and order-
ing submission of contract to membership after union had delayed ratification vote in New York until
agreement was reached in all other Atlantic and Gulf Coast ports).
Actually reaching the membership with this protected activity may be a different story. Contract
dissidents have frequently had to litigate the questions of access to union membership lists or publica-
tions. See Lodge 1380, Bhd. of Ry. Clerks v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1980). A union was
recently ordered to accept a paid advertisement in its national weekly magazine from a local opposed
to a proposed national agreement. Knox County Local, Nat'l Rural Letter Carriers' Ass'n v.
NRLCA, 720 F.2d 936, 940 (6th Cir. 1983). The court noted, but did not rest its decision on, the
absence of other feasible means for reaching the 64,000 members of a national union. Id. at 940-41.
818
Collective Bargaining
Nor is the law's deference to abuses of democratic ratification limited to
gerrymandered voting districts and deceptive propaganda. Many cases in-
dicate considerable manipulation of the balloting process. Although such
gross defects as falsifying the ballot results can be reached through law,9
less blatant infringements of a fair ballot have not been corrected. 5
C. The Law of Democratic Negotiations
Attempts to use the law to grant rank-and-file access to collective bar-
gaining at an earlier stage than at final ratification may be surveyed more
quickly. The law has rarely been invoked to broaden participation in the
formation and articulation of demands. It appears that the duty of fair
representation imposes on unions only a modest and ill-defined obligation
to consider employees' interests. Attempts by the rank-and-file to obtain
particular bargaining results are difficult to enforce, while the union can
cure any deviant bargain by employee ratification. Finally, although the
circuits are divided, some courts have invoked trusteeships over locals to
impose elitist bargaining control even where such a trusteeship would not
be available for other purposes.
1. Observing Democratic Procedures for Demand Formation: Fair
Representation Does Not Mean Actual Participation.
The Steele case,9" which gave birth to the duty of fair representation,
suggested that the Railway Labor Act might of its own force impose cer-
tain democratic procedural obligations on unions forming bargaining de-
mands, namely notice to the affected employees and entertainment of their
objections.9 7 Only four subsequent cases, however, appear to have ad-
Moreover, the court's statement that "although the union leaders may control their union's publica-
tions, those publications are 'owned' in equal shares by the members whose union dues finance them,"
id. at 940, suggests that access might be available to dissidents unable to pay the going rate for
commercial advertising.
94. Aguirre v. Automotive Teamsters, 633 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1980) (allegations of fraudulent
tally of ballots and false announcement that contract had been ratified sufficient to state claims under
LMRDA § 101(a)(1) and duty of fair representation).
95. See Petroff v. Teamsters Local 610, 96 L.R.R.M. 3410 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (refusing to enjoin
collective agreement allegedly ratified without adequate notice under union constitution and ordering
plaintiffs to exhaust internal union remedies); Arnold v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 653A, 60
L.R.R.M. 2013 (D. Minn. 1965) (denying injunction against exclusion of plaintiffs from expressing
opinions on ratification or casting "meaningful vote" on theory that union members had not demon-
strated "irreparable harm").
96. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (discussed supra p. 806).
97. Id. at 195-96, 204. Professor Finkin regards this obligation as limited to employees affected
by collective bargaining who are excluded from union membership. Finkin, supra note 51, at 202.
Professor Finkin puts great stress on the following language in Steele:
While the statute does not deny to such a bargaining labor organization the right to determine
eligibility to its membership, it does require the union, in collective bargaining and in making
contracts with the carrier, to represent non-union or minority union members of the craft
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 93: 793, 1984
dressed the claim that a union's process of forming demands is so elitist as
to violate fair representation.
The earliest example involved a union's particularly gross disregard of
one group's concerns to advance the interests of another, along with the
union's violation of its own internal procedures.9" The Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad began gradually to eliminate dining-car service in one of
three functioning seniority districts (District Three). The local president,
at the urging of a leader of the affected employees, attempted secretly to
dovetail the employees into a surviving district (District One). Without
consulting the Joint Council or the employees in District One, the local
president struck an agreement with the railroad and then disclosed the
dovetailing agreement only to the employees in District Three, who were
asked to keep it secret. Employees of District One heard of the agreement
only when some of them were bumped by employees of District Three.'
The court described the union's actions as "fraud and bad faith" against
employees of District One.' 00 Similarly, a consistent pattern of refusing to
without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith. Wherever necessary to
that end, the union is required to consider requests of non-union members of the craft and
expressions of their views with respect to collective bargaining with the employer and to give to
them notice of and opportunity for hearing upon its proposed action.
323 U.S. at 204.
Professor Finkin argues that the inclusion of "minority union members" in the first sentence, which
concerns substantive negotiating positions, and its omission from the second sentence, discussing proce-
dures for demand formation, was deliberate. Under this reading, Steele creates two obligations: sub-
stantive obligations owed all employees in the unit, and procedural obligations owed only to employees
excluded from union membership.
This is not the only possible reading. Elsewhere in Steele, the Court does not distinguish between
substantive and procedural obligations or members and nonmembers, as in its discussion of the need to
avoid unrest generated by minorities excluded from the negotiation process. 323 U.S. at 200.
Moreover, it is as easy to argue that the entire Steele opinion, not merely its discussion of union
procedural obligations, should have been limited to nonmembers. The plaintiffs in Steele were ex-
cluded from union membership because of their race; consequently, they were unquestionably entitled
to both substantive and procedural consideration. The Steele case, as a matter of precedent, could not
have decided the question of minority or other union members. Yet when unions actually argued that
Steele should not apply to claims of union members, their contention was rejected in a one-sentence,
per curiam opinion. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
Finally, as Professor Finkin admits, his suggested reading of Steele finds no support in subsequent
cases actually addressing the question of procedural participation by union members. The cases ex-
tend such a right of participation to union members, Bolt v. Joint Council Dining Car Employees,
Local 495, 50 L.R.R.M. 2190 (S.D. Fla. 1961), aff'd mem., 301 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1962), and to
voluntary nonmembers, Branch 6000, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808
(D.C. Cir. 1979); American Postal Workers Union, Headquarters Local 6885 v. American Postal
Workers Union, 113 L.R.R.M. 2433 (D.D.C. 1982). The group that has received no procedural
protection is those employees excluded from union membership. Beriault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes
& Checkers of the Int'l Longshoremen's Union, 445 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Or. 1978).
98. Bolt v. Joint Council Dining Car Employees, Local 495, 50 L.R.R.M. 2190 (S.D. Fla. 1961),
aff'd mem., 301 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1962).
99. The facts of the case are discussed in id. at 2190-94.
100. Id. at 2194. Strictly speaking, the statement was dictum. The union subsequently put the
local into trusteeship and held a vote among all affected employees, which resulted in a plan to merge
the districts with District 3's employees endtailed. The union's request to the railroad to renegotiate
the secret agreement along these lines was pending at the time of the suit. The fair representation suit
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negotiate members' demands and negotiating only the leaders' proposals
may indicate a failure of fair representation." 1
When the union abandons a representation function in favor of a uni-
lateral, standard-setting referendum for affected employees, the union
must permit nonmembers to participate along with members.1 2 Nonethe-
less, a union that is "apprised of the position" of all affected subgroups in
the union and gives each "due consideration," including "meaningful or
was brought by the District 3 employees, complaining that the union had deprived them of the secret
dovetailing agreement. The court's observation that the dovetailing agreement resulted from procedu-
ral violations of the union constitution and substantive violations of the duty of fair representation
supported its dismissal of the fair representation suit seeking to reinstate the secret agreement.
The case is nevertheless significant because, unlike the other "fair bargaining procedure" case,
Branch 6000, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (discussed
infra note 102), it cannot be cast into substantive terms. Apart from the procedure of its creation, and
in the absence of contrary union policy or practice, there could be no substantive objection to a merger
of seniority districts dovetailing affected employees. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
Had such a dovetailing provision entered the collective agreement through procedurally correct steps,
employees would have had a right to its enforcement. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195
(1962); Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 633 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1980); Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures,
Inc., 582 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1978); Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective
Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. Rav. 251, 258-63 (1977). Only
because the dovetailing agreement was entered into secretly, without notice to affected employees even
at intervening district meetings and without the required approval of the Joint Council, did it vest no
rights in employees and provide no basis for a fair representation suit.
101. Farmer v. Hotel Workers, Local 1064, 96 L.R.R.M. 2166, 2168-69, 2186 (E.D. Mich.
1978). The members' demands were for the dismantling of sexually discriminatory job structures
favored by the leadership; query the applicability of the case to other leadership rejection of members'
demands.
102. Branch 6000, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The
pertinent national agreement left specified issues for local negotiation, including whether weekly days
off would be on a fixed or rotating basis. The branch representing letter carriers at approximately 110
Post Offices instructed stewards to negotiate for "[w]hatever the membership in your station desire."
The exclusion of voluntary nonmembers from the referendum was found by the NLRB to violate the
duty of fair representation. 232 N.L.R.B. 263 (1977).
In the view of the court of appeals, the "delegation of the decisionmaking function to the union
membership" became a denial of fair representation only because it was understood that "each union
member would vote his personal preference," 595 F.2d at 812. Under this view, the interests of
nonmembers would simply be ignored. Although fair representation requires some consideration of
their interests, the court in this case appeared indifferent to whether the consideration is undertaken
by the union membership or leadership.
Branch 6000 seems the only case actually to hold that the duty of fair representation imposes
procedural obligations on the union's formation of demands other than those imposed by the union's
own constitution and by-laws. Removed from the rather unusual setting of a referendum that will
bind employer and union, the case does hold that fair representation during negotiation requires-and
may require a consistent procedure which necessitates-"communication access for employees with a
divergent view." 595 F.2d at 813. Nevertheless, the holding rests on assumptions that this Article aims
to question and supplant. The case regards democratic collective bargaining as deviant. Indeed, only
by equating elitist governance with normality could the court derive such a strange concept as the
"delegation of the decisionmaking function to the union membership." Id. at 812. More significantly,
however, the court's emphasis on accountability militates in favor of elitist bargaining. The court
could reserve the question of bargaining policy referenda because "the bargaining responsibility re-
mains with an individual or committee charged with the obligation of fair representation" and benefit-
ing as well from a "presumption" of "good faith." 595 F.2d at 812. On the other hand, democratic
formation of demands by the whole membership, while not a violation of the duty of fair representa-
tion "under all circumstances," would have to include "appropriate safeguards" to reflect the interests
of nonmembers of the union. 595 F.2d at 812.
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adequate opportunity for consideration of their position," does not violate
fair representation by reversing its previous bargaining position without
formal notice to the affected group.103 Nor are any particular "formal
procedures" for the consideration of the subgroup's interests required. 04
Since the duty of fair representation originated in the need for effective
intraunion representation of minorities, that duty is perhaps an unattrac-
tive vehicle for requiring that formation of bargaining demands respond
generally to the needs of the majority. Breach of the union's own internal
procedures (as in Bolt) should in any case constitute a breach of the duty.
On the whole, I would prefer that democratic formation of bargaining
demands be safeguarded under LMRDA's rights to equal participation.
Despite one cursory holding that the Act applies to referenda on bargain-
ing policy, however,' 05 there has been little doctrinal development in this
direction.
2. Enforcing Democratically Derived Substantive Limitations on
Negotiator Autonomy
A few unions have gone beyond regulating the procedures of demand
formation and have substantively bound their negotiators as well.108 The
legal effect of such provisions is unclear. Suppose, for example, that a
union's constitution or policy statement requires that, in the event senior-
ity units are merged, all employees are to be "dovetailed"-that is, ranked
by length of service for whichever employer. Suppose further, however,
that the union succeeds in negotiating an "endtailed" agreement whereby
103. Waiters Union, Local 781 v. Hotel Ass'n, 498 F.2d 998, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1974). From the
perspective of democratic bargaining, the court would have been better advised to avoid resolving
whether the union had a duty to communicate the progress of negotiations to affected members, and to
hold instead that the neglect of such a duty caused no harm in the waiters' case. Indeed, the court's
subsequent decision in Warehouse Union, Local 860 v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
supports the existence of such a duty of communication of employer plans to close a department if
employee wage increases were obtained. It is hard to see why fair representation should require the
union to keep members apprised of the employer's negotiating positions but not of its own. Under
such an interpretation of Waiters Union, employees victimized by a secret shift in the union's negoti-
ating position should be permitted to show in appropriate cases that they were harmed by the shift, in
the sense that they would have acted differently had they known. Cf. Robesky v. Qantas Airlines, 573
F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978) (applying harm standard to evaluate union noncommunication with indi-
vidual grievant).
104. Waiters Union, 498 F.2d at 1000. For a rather complex proposal for "formal procedures"
which unions might voluntarily adopt, see Silverstein, Union Decisions on Collective Bargaining
Goals: A Proposal for Interest Group Participation, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1979).
105. Thomas v. United Mine Workers, 422 F. Supp. 1111 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd on motionfor
reconsid., 95 L.R.R.M. 2365 (D.D.C. 1977).
106. See Cook, Dual Government in Unions: A Tool for Analysis, 15 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv.
323, 328 (1962); Lahne, Union Constitutions and Collective Bargaining Procedures, in TRADE
UNION GovERNMENT AND COLLECTVE BARGAINING 167, 172-73, 175 (J. Seidman ed. 1970)
(identifying seven union constitutions specifying certain contractual terms, e.g., on overtime or tools
used, and forbidding either locals from contracting without these clauses or employees from working
without them).
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all of company A's employees are ranked ahead of those of company B,
even though some of B's employees are more senior. Thus, A's employees
may bump employees of B with greater seniority. Suppose finally that the
union could have negotiated either agreement. 107 What can the bumped
employees do?
When the employees sue, they typically assert that the union officials
who negotiated the unauthorized agreement breached a contract with the
membership, violated fiduciary obligations owed the membership, violated
the equal rights provision of LMRDA, and violated the duty of fair rep-
resentation. While dicta, and one holding, support the existence of these
causes of action, I have been unable to locate any reported case in which
employees have successfully enjoined a collective agreement because of its
substantive violation of internal union rules.
In theory, the simplest cause of action would be to allege that the union
by-law, policy, or referendum represented a contract among the members
or between the leaders and the members that the leaders violated. Such
claims have resulted in formidable instances of judicial evasion. One
prominent if somewhat unsavory avoidance which denied federal jurisdic-
tion in suits based on union constitutions unless federal intervention
against a strike was necessary, 10 8 has recently been choked off by the Su-
preme Court. 09 Other evasions exist, however, including the bizarre re-
cent holding that contractual claims under union constitutions or by-laws
are preempted by the National Labor Relations Act.110
107. Obviously a different situation is presented when an employer adamantly, although in good
faith, refuses to concede the demand found in the union's by-laws. While such situations present
difficult problems, the courts' analytic approach is nevertheless troubling. In Deboles v. Trans World
Airlines, 552 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977), the union claimed falsely that it
was attempting a seniority merger to which management was opposed. The truth was that the union
was not even raising the demand, although it appeared that, if raised, management would have re-
sisted. In Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Folkes, 201 Va. 49, 109 S.E.2d 392 (1959), the union
apparently tried, but failed, to negotiate the agreement on compulsory retirement which the members
had required through referendum. In both of these cases, the unions persuaded the courts to dismiss
the memberships' suits for breaches of the duty of fair representation. Although there are obvious
problems with subsequent judicial scrutiny of the efficacy of a union's unsuccessful negotiating efforts,
one still wonders if, in a suit alleging the union's failure to represent manifest employee instructions,
the fact that the union was acceding to employer desires must always represent a complete defense.
108. See Baker v. Newspaper & Graphic Communications Union, Local 6, 628 F.2d 156, 163-64
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (denying federal jurisdiction and relying on 1199 D.C., Nat'l Union of Hosp. &
Health Care Employees v. National Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 533 F.2d 1205 (D.C.
Cir. 1976)). The 1199 D.C. doctrine, which in its heyday enjoyed considerable popularity in other
circuits, generally denied federal jurisdiction to suits by a union to enforce the union's constitution or
by-laws but made an exception where the alleged violation of internal union rules harmed the em-
ployer's interests by presenting "actual threats to industrial peace." 533 F.2d at 1208. This cynically
transformed a jurisdictional statute-LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), creates federal jurisdic-
tion for suits to enforce "agreements among unions"-into a strike-control measure.
109. See United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. v.
Local 334, 452 U.S. 615 (1981) (allegations of threats to industrial peace unnecessary to state cause of
action).
110. Baker, 628 F.2d at 160-63. The merger agreement between the two unions formerly repre-
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In cases dealing with union referenda other than those concerning bar-
senting pressmen and stereotypers provided that, if the stereotyping department were eliminated, ste-
reotypers could retrain for pressroom jobs but would go to the end of the seniority roster. The stere-
otyping department was eliminated. The union acceded to the employer's demand for dovetailing the
stereotypers without raising the issue of the contrary requirement of the union's internal merger
agreement. Pressmen whose seniority was adversely affected sued to enforce the merger agreement and
the international and local constitutions.
The Court held that this cause of action was preempted under San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The holding is preposterous. In the first place, Garmon preemption, in
the era of its most expansive interpretation, applied only to conduct "arguably" protected by NLRA §
7, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976), or "arguably" prohibited by NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1976). 359
U.S. at 245. The Baker court made no real effort to show that the union's conduct was either argua-
bly protected or prohibited. Although the Court correctly suggested that the union's bargaining con-
duct was "protected" by § 7, this section protects against employer interference and is irrelevant when
the claim is that the union's conduct has trampled members' rights. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (no federal preemption of state-law tort suit concerning
union's tortious administration of hiring hall, despite general doctrine that § 7 protects hiring hall
administration).
Second, the Court gave insufficient weight to the recent substantial modification of Gannon in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978). Under
Sears, judicial process against arguably prohibited conduct is constitutional unless the judicial pro-
ceeding is "identical" to an NLRB proceeding available to the plaintiff. Id. at 197. Since the Baker
court did not identify any such NLRB proceeding at all, it was in no position to show that such a
non-existent proceeding was "identical" to the claimed violation of the merger agreement. Sears also
held that judicial proceedings against protected conduct are constitutional where judicial proceedings
would create no "significant risk" of prohibition of federally protected conduct. Id. at 207. The Baker
court, not surprisingly, did not attempt to make the finding of "significant risk" required by Sears.
In support of its preemption holding, the Baker court discussed only one other case, Amalgamated
Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). The case is
inapposite. In Lockridge, an employee improperly suspended from union membership for asserted
dues arrearages sued for reinstatement in state court. The union conduct was not only a well-estab-
lished unfair labor practice, as the Lockridge Court established with considerable care, id. at 292-93,
but NLRB action had actually been invoked by at least one fellow employee of Lockridge who was
identically situated. Id. at 280 n.3. Lockridge thus represents the category-a category clearly identi-
fied by such subsequent Supreme Court decisions as Farmer and Sears-of judicial proceedings
"identical to" proceedings which might have been presented to the NLRB. See Local 926, Int'l Union
of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 103 S. Ct. 1453 (1983). Baker in no way represents such a case.
Finally, preemption was inappropriate in Baker on grounds unrelated to the Gannon-Sears analy-
sis. In a series of cases under LMRA § 301 in which collective agreements were enforced, the Su-
preme Court has held that LMRA § 301, where applicable, represents a pro tanto lifting of the
preemption doctrine. That is, LMRA § 301 represents a precise congressional determination-the
"ultimate touchstone" in preemption analysis, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn,
375 U.S. 95, 103 (1963)-to permit concurrent lawsuits in state and federal court even though an
NLRB charge might be filed on the same facts. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 178-83 (1967); Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 95, 101 n.9 (1962).
At one time, however, the Supreme Court distinguished the two jurisdictional clauses of § 301(a),
which create jurisdiction in suits for violation of "contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation" as well as "contracts. . . between any such labor organizations." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
While the former suits could proceed in state or federal court even when they alleged unfair labor
practices, the latter could not. See Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 292-94 (NLRB in hypothetical § 8(b)(2)
proceeding would interpret union constitution; thus state court action to enforce constitution would
conflict with NLRB proceeding); Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden,
373 U.S. 690, 697 (1963).
This difference in preemptive (hence constitutional) effect between two parallel clauses in the same
statute is not easy to explain. Since preemption normally rests on the intent, legislatively expressed or
implied, of Congress, it is difficult to explain why a Congress which on the same day and in the same
statute (the Taft-Hartley Act or LMRA) gave the NLRB general jurisdiction over union restraint or
coercion of employee organizational rights (NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976)),
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gaining policy, courts have found a duty in the union leadership to comply
with the results of balloting, derived from the fiduciary obligations of
LMRDA § 501.111 Yet disregard by a union's leadership of its members'
adopted standards for collective agreements has been held nonaction-
able."' There are, however, exceptions. Three courts, while finding par-
ticular expressions of bargaining policy nonbinding on negotiators, have
been more careful not to reject the idea of such a suit."' Finally, one
and the federal courts express jurisdiction over suits to enforce agreements among unions (LMRA §
301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976)), meant mysteriously to have the former stand silently preempt the
latter. If there is to be a difference in the preemptive effect of the two jurisdictional grants of § 301(a),
it is, if anything, the sphere of internal union affairs as to which Congress subsequently expressly
approved the concurrent exercise of authority by state and federal courts, LMRDA §§ 103, 603, 29
U.S.C. §§ 413, 523 (1976).
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumb-
ing & Pipefitting Indus. v. Local 334, United Ass'n, 452 U.S. 615 (1981), goes a long way toward
eliminating any supposed difference between the parallel grants of jurisdiction over collective agree-
ments and union constitutions. The next step is to reject any implication that the fortuitous coexis-
tence of NLRB proceedings preempts either congressional grant of jurisdiction.
111. E.g., Pignotti v. Local 3 Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 477 F.2d 825, 832-35 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973); Johnson v. Nelson, 325 F.2d 646, 651 (8th Cir. 1963).
112. Baker v. Newspaper & Graphic Communications Union, Local 6, 628 F.2d 156, 166 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (fair representation claim: "[W]e know of no case which has held that an internal union
agreement can restrict the union's power to negotiate with respect to seniority in collective bargain-
ing."); Acker v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 95 L.R.R.M. 2327 (D. Minn. 1977) (holding no
violation of LMRDA § 101(a)(1) occurred when local members' preferences not followed in seniority
merger case). The Acker court said:
Apparently this claim is based on the assumption that once the union decided to poll the
members for their preferences, it was bound to observe strict standards and to follow the
wishes of the membership. This claim must be rejected. This union has plenary discretion in
determining whether to poll the membership on the seniority consolidation issues. Since a
referendum is not required, the union can conduct the poll in any manner whatsoever without
bringing § 101 (a) (1) into play. Union officials can even decline to follow the preferences of
the membership, although of course, they do so at the peril of being ousted from office in the
next election.
95 L.R.R.M. at 2333. For a state court's view of these problems, see Witherspoon v. Grand Int'l Bhd.
of Locomotive Eng'rs, 260 S.C. 117, 194 S.E.2d 399 (1973) (negotiation of seniority merger contrary
to union constitution, even if proven, would not permit injunction against collective agreement).
113. Vincent v. IBEW, 622 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir. 1980) (fiduciary obligation; union interna-
tional offices and staff not obligated to negotiate for pension plan favored by members where mem-
bers' vote was subject to approval by international, and international's preference for local's inclusion
into a pre-existing plan was justified: "At worst, the decision to go with the Chattanooga plan was an
attempt to forge a compromise among all interested parties. . . ."); Bright v. Taylor, 554 F.2d 854
(8th Cir. 1977) (LMRDA and fiduciary obligation; union not obligated to bring back seniority propo-
sal for separate membership approval where membership motions asking for such approval ambigu-
ous, union leaders not secretive about fact that seniority being negotiated, eventual contract submitted
for ratification, no false or misleading statements made during ratification; contract was ratified, and
defendants had no interest or ulterior motive in negotiation of eventual seniority plan). If the union
conduct in Bright could be depended on in all unions, there would be little need for concern about the
enforceability of pre-bargaining restrictions on negotiators' autonomy.
Laturner v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 501 F.2d 593, 598-603 (9th Cir. 1974), reserved decision
on whether negotiation of a collective agreement in conflict with the union's constitution would re-
present a breach of the duty of fair representation, finding that the constitutional provision, when read
in the context of the debates at the adopting convention, had as its primary purpose "to give the union
officers great flexibility in formulating methods to integrate seniority rosters [and] that no single
method was intended to be proscribed." Id. at 600.
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court of appeals has found that a suit (apparently founded on a fair repre-
sentation theory) alleging negotiators' disregard of internally adopted
union standards stated a cognizable claim.
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There are, of course, obvious difficulties with stringent enforcement of
restrictions on negotiators, although in many of the cases the claim was
made that the employer had left the particular matter in controversy en-
tirely to the union, which makes the leadership's deviation from majority
rule more questionable. Several of the cases suggest that ratification by the
membership cures any deviation by the negotiators from previously
adopted standards.11 5 In theory, such ratification ensures fairness if the
ratifying constituency is the same as the constituency which adopted the
restrictions lest the members bind themselves against any subsequent edu-
cation, or even against their changing their minds.11 The ratification vote
that approves the deviation from union standards should also be informed
and reasoned, with adequate opportunities for opposing views. The re-
fusal of the courts to enforce minimal integrity in ratification 17 or even to
enforce a ratification at all, 8 makes somewhat opportunistic any reliance
on ratification as a defense to claims that negotiators ignored democrati-
cally-adopted standards.
3. Trusteeships in the Service of Elitist Bargaining
One court of appeals has apparently held that trusteeships are available
to a union enforcing a uniform, elite-determined bargaining stance,
though such a trusteeship could not be imposed generally for other union
purposes.11 Another court of appeals has apparently rejected the distinc-
114. Frederickson v. System Fed'n No. 114, Ry. Employees Dep't, 436 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1970)
(employees endtailed in face of union "policy statement" favoring adjusted seniority, subsequent con-
vention amendment to constitution, and by-laws requiring dovetailing). The question of specific relief
was not decided. Apparently plaintiffs sought declaratory relief against the endtailing. There is no
further report of Frederickson, which is rarely cited; the cases cited supra notes 112-13 all ignore it.
115. Baker v. Newspaper & Graphic Communications Union, Local 6, 628 F.2d 156, 168 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Bright v. Taylor, 554 F.2d 854, 857-58 (8th Cir. 1977); Bolt v. Joint Council Dining Car
Employees, Local 495, 50 L.R.R.M. 2190 (S.D. Fla. 1961), aff'd mem., 301 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1962);
see Finkin, supra note 97, at 233.
116. A different situation is obviously presented if the restriction on autonomy in negotiation is
adopted by the union as a whole and is ignored by a particular subdivision. The strongest case for
such relief occurs when the union policy is expressly adopted to favor a particular minority group,
and the local ratifying a contrary agreement is voting its own self-interest. This was allegedly the
situation in Frederickson, where the senior employees, the precise object of protection by the interna-
tional, were assertedly endtailed as a result of political pressure from the members of a more numer-
ous and politically powerful seniority district. 436 F.2d at 767.
117. See supra pp. 815-19.
118. See supra pp. 807-14.
119. Gordon v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 490 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1973). The International ordered
Local 612 in Oklahoma City to affiliate with the other Oklahoma locals in a district council. Local
612 refused and reached a separate agreement with the Associated General Contractors which "did
not contain the health, welfare, and pension benefits obtained for other Oklahoma locals by the Dis-
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tion.12° The conflict is one that cries out for a policy favoring democratic
collective bargaining. This is not necessarily the same thing as local bar-
gaining. A union might decide, democratically, to negotiate a national or
other large-scale agreement, and thus by implication commit itself to
preventing breakaway locals from settling for less and going back to work.
A court that would here refuse to permit a trusteeship on the local is not
vindicating democracy. It is (at best) vindicating a sort of sterile "local
autonomy" and (at worst) seriously interfering with union's bargaining
power and democracy.
Such a court would also lack a statutory basis for its policy. American
labor law is indifferent to whether unions and management agree to bar-
gain in single-plant, multi-plant, or even multi-employer structures.1 2"
Nor does the LMRDA in general, or Title III on trusteeships, adopt a
trict Council." Id. at 136. The International imposed a trusteeship on Local 612. The court held the
trusteeship validly imposed and remanded the question of the validity of the separate agreement to the
district court.
In reaching this result, the court was obliged to distinguish its earlier decision in United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. Brown, 343 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1965), in which a trusteeship, imposed in order to
affiliate one local with a district council, was enjoined. The court adduced two grounds of distinction.
The first was a purported distinction between the constitution of the Carpenters' and the Laborers'
Unions, since LMRDA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 462 (1976), provides that trusteeships may be established
"only in accordance with the constitution and by-laws of the organization which has assumed trustee-
ship." In Brown, the court held that the Carpenters' constitution contained "no specific provision
authorizing it to impose a trusteeship on any of its subordinate local unions." 343 F.2d at 881. Nor
did the court in Brown defer to the contrary finding of the Carpenters' General Executive Board that
provisions empowering it "to take such action as is necessary and proper for the welfare" of the union
constituted such an implicit grant of authority. Id. at 882. By contrast, in Gordon the International's
General Executive Board "made specific findings and concluded that the imposition of a trusteeship
was within the power of the International's President under Article IX, § 7, of its constitution." 490
F.2d at 137. The deference to the General Executive Board in the Gordon case seems to conflict with
the textual literalism of Brown.
The second, true ground of distinction between the cases was the old assumption that elitism in the
service of collective bargaining is a sort of federal exception to the law of union democracy:
In Brown the trusteeship was imposed because the local would not affiliate with the district
council and would not raise its dues. The court pointed out that these actions "have nothing
whatever to do with collective bargaining." 343 F.2d at 883. Collective bargaining is at the
heart of the case before us.
490 F.2d at 136-37.
120. Benda v. Grand Lodge of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 584 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1978),
affirmed an injunction granted against the imposition of a trusteeship imposed on District Lodge 508.
As in Gordon, the lodge had resisted the International's attempt to coordinate bargaining; here, the
coordination was among all IAM locals negotiating with Lockheed Aircraft or any of its subsidiaries.
And, as in Gordon, the lodge had attempted to place before its members a contract proposal that other
lodges' negotiators would not even take to their members. At this point, the International suspended
all officers at Lodge 508 and took control. The court affirmed an injunction against the trusteeship,
despite a 1958 International Circular which gave the International's President the right to combine
bargaining units to deal with "the same employer." The court held that "the same employer" might
only mean each subsidiary, without explaining its failure to defer to the obvious contrary determina-
tion by the International in this case. Additionally, the court held that the history of separate voting in
each subsidiary forbade the International from "interfering with the bargaining process." 584 F.2d at
317.
121. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, Int'l Union v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1969).
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principle of "local autonomy." It is a statute that seeks to introduce de-
mocracy at all levels.122
From this perspective, the general limits on trusteeship in Title III of
the LMRDA implement union democracy, not local autonomy. The only
question in the cases imposing trusteeships to enforce bargaining unity
should be one of union democracy: Is the bargaining stance as to which
unity is sought the product of democratic formation of demands, taken
after rank-and-file participation? If so, then the trusteeship serves the
LMRDA's purposes of "assuring the performance of. . . duties of a bar-
gaining representative, restoring democratic procedures, or otherwise car-
rying out the legitimate objects of such labor organization" and is not
unlawful.1"' If, by contrast, bargaining unity is imposed by an unrespon-
sive elite, the trusteeship should be suspect, for the bargaining position
might benefit the leaders at the expense of the membership and thus raise
the possibility of breach of their duty of fair representation. In short, in
the area of trusteeships as elsewhere, ongoing collective bargaining is no
reason to limit union democracy. Yet these questions on bargaining de-
mocracy are just the questions not asked in the trusteeship cases.
II. THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SCHOOL'S ATTACK ON
DEMOCRATIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The paradox of this Article may now be stated. Legal decisions, under
an articulated norm of democracy in collective bargaining, generally pre-
suppose and frequently reinforce elitism in bargaining. What accounts for
this choice for elitism in situations in which democracy might as easily
have been fostered?
The cases, as we have seen, rarely even mention the double standard
122. LMRDA § 3(i), 29 U.S.C. § 402(i) (1976) (defining "labor organization"); see also id. §
101(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3)(B) (1976) (election of national officers). A hypothesized policy of
"local autonomy" would be a good example of what Franz Neumann called "constitutional fetish-
ism." See infra note 156.
123. LMRDA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 462 (1976). Judged by this standard, it appears that the trust-
eeships in Benda v. Grand Lodge of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 584 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1978), and
Gordon v. Laborers' int'l Union, 490 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1973), both sought to achieve greater
benefits for the members and should not have been enjoined. One might want to know a bit more
about the democratic basis of the International Circular in Benda, and the constitution in Gordon,
which assertedly authorized the trusteeships. One might also want to be certain in Gordon that the
benefit plans into which the laborers wanted Local 612 merged were in the members' interest rather
than imposed because of greater elite control over the relevant benefit plan. Absent considerations of
this kind, which implicate union democracy, a union should be allowed to decide democratically to
bargain in larger units and to enforce local compliance with the will of the greater number. For a
contrasting example of national control of local bargaining, which survived attack under current stan-
dards but might not survive the proposed "democracy" standard, see Local 472, United Ass'n of
Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. v. Georgia Power Co., 684 F.2d
721 (11th Cir. 1982), in which the international leadership, on request of the employer, transferred
the counties of particular interest to the employer out of the jurisdiction of the local.
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that divides collective bargaining from other areas of union democracy;
they seldom articulate any policy supporting this double standard. Recent
critical scholarship suggests that the legal system in such situations is most
probably adopting silently the assumptions of the dominant school of in-
dustrial relations scholarship.12
A leading industrial relations textbook, after informing its readers of
the "almost universal" practice of ratification of collective agreements,
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adduces several "advantages" to this practice. Among these are that rati-
fied agreements, particularly covering national unions or large locals, are
more likely to be acceptable to union members, and that union members
are more likely to comply with agreements which they themselves have
ratified.12 6
The textbook continues: "Despite the validity of these arguments, sig-
nificant objections may be raised to the policy of limiting the authority of
union negotiators by requiring a majority membership approval of the
agreements which they conclude.112 7 The authors identify three such ob-
124. Lynd, Government Without Rights: The Labor Law Vision of Archibald Cox, 4 INDUS.REL
L.J. 483, 487 (1981); Stone, The Post War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509,
1509 (1981); Klare, supra note 25; cf. J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LA-
BOR LAW 3 (1983) (suggesting that even consensus among industrial relations scholars will be unin-
fluential when incompatible with limited set of "values and assumptions" fundamental to capitalism
generally and specifically to managerial ideologies associated with capitalist factory production). Elit-
ist bargaining fits neatly into both liberal industrial relations scholarship and capitalist managerial
ideology, so it is unnecessary here to identify a set of values consistent with one but not the other.
125. N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 61 (2d ed. 1965). As we have
seen, the presence of a ratification requirement in some union documents scarcely guarantees that the
practice of ratification will result. See supra notes 33, 37, 73. Moreover, union constitutional provi-
sions requiring ratification are considerably less than "universal." See supra note 45.
126. N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, supra note 125, at 62. This discussion exemplifies the
strangely divided quality of discussions of democracy in the collective bargaining process. The two
"advantages" referred to have entirely different forms. The first appears to be an invocation of the
principle of democracy, both for its own sake and as a guarantor of substantive fairness in terms of
employment. The second is strictly an argument of policy-an empirical claim that strikes and work
stoppages will diminish if agreements are ratified. The "interests" of working people in procedural
and substantive fairness, and the "interests" of managers and consumers in the control of strikes, are
lumped together as "advantages" of a reified system in which all interests are in harmony and an
advantage to the system is an advantage to all.
The empirical-policy claim of the second advantage is unsupported. I am unaware of any general
attempt to correlate the incidence of strikes or other stoppages in contravention of contractual prohibi-
tion with the ratification or non-ratification of the underlying agreement. There may of course be
particular examples of the phenomenon that Clyde Summers described: "When negotiators try to bind
employees with an agreement that the latter find unacceptable, the employer may obtain neither the
productivity nor the peace for which he bargained." Summers, Ratification of Agreements, in FRON-
TIERS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 75, 84 (J. Dunlop & N. Chamberlain eds. 1967). Counterexam-
ples, however, are obvious. Agreements of the United Mine Workers (under which, in the last decade,
wildcat strike activity has been endemic) are ratified by the membership. P. CLARK, THE MINERS'
FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY: ARNOLD MILLER AND THE REFORM OF THE UNITED MINE WORKERS
62-74 (1981). The national Basic Steel Agreement (under which strike activity is almost unheard of)
is not ratified by the rank and file. See supra note 64.
127. N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, supra note 125, at 63. Note the reliance on the elitist model.
Union negotiators, even under an "almost universal" practice of ratification, are assumed to have
"authority" to "conclude" agreements except where "limit[ed]" by the membership.
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jections. First, union negotiators have more information than the member-
ship. Second, they will lose the respect of the employer if the agreement is
voted down. Finally, rejection puts "'both the company and the union
committee in a very embarrassing position and results either in a serious
strike or in a better settlement.' "128
These countervailing considerations do not, according to the authors,
stand in equipose. Ratification, they conclude, may have its place in small
units in which all workers may be assembled.129 They are less enthusiastic
about ratification in other situations:
But in negotiations involving not only large numbers of employees
but also those employees scattered in more than one plant of the
same company or in more than one company, the arguments against
the requirement of membership approval attain almost conclusive
force . . . . Under these conditions it is probable that collective bar-
gaining would profit from a placement of full authority in the hands
of union negotiators. [Negotiators should be appointed, not elected,
and should educate the members as to the] economic conditions in
which bargaining is to take place.130
This is a typical defense of elitist bargaining, and I take issue with its
assumption and conclusions. It would, however, be an enormous mistake
to take this defense at face value and to attempt to refute it by addressing
each argument. The arguments are risible; they assume the very points
contended-as if the goal of national labor policy were nothing more than
to spare union leaders and management "embarrassment." The defense
acquires whatever force it has-and I suggest that the law in the area
reflects its enormous force-by virtue of its ideological assumptions, which
we shall see are shared, by most industrial relations scholarship on collec-
tive bargaining."31
128. Id. (quoting a company negotiator). The last sentence would be much clearer (as a matter of
syntax) if the union's "embarassment" were distinguished from the employer's, and each attributed to
its proprietor. Such a construction would, however, miss the central ideological tenet of the industrial
relations school that "the union" (defined here, as usual, to mean the leadership and staff) and the
employer share the same interests, so that if one is embarrassed, the other must be as well.
129. Id. at 63-64.
130. Id. at 64. Proposals that unions be legally required to adopt elitist bargaining enjoyed some
popularity in the late 1960's. See, e.g., Dunlop, The Sodal Utility of Collective Bargaining, in THE
AMERICAN ASSEMBLY: CHALLENGES TO COLLECtiVE BARGAINING 168, 179 (1967) ("[ljnternational
union officers should be expressly authorized, with the approval of the international union executive
board, to sign collective bargaining agreements without ratification of the employees directly af-
fected."); American Management Ass'n Personnel Conference, Report, 1967 LAB. REL. Y.B. 275,
reprinted in H.R. 5553, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (violation of duty to bargain when employer or
union bargains through agent not fully authorized to enter agreement without further ratification).
131. Since I will hereafter address my remarks solely to the issue of democracy in collective bar-
gaining, it is worth pointing out, in the excerpt from Chamberlain and Kuhn cited supra note 130,
the continuing assault on industrial unionism. Presumably even in craft unions negotiators have rela-
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Industrial relations scholarship on the subject of collective bargaining is
informed by four basic assumptions concerning elitism and democracy: (1)
elitism in bargaining is inevitable; (2) democracy is unnecessary since
there is no conflict of interest between union leadership and membership;
(3) democracy is inflationary; and (4) democracy is excessively inefficient
and cumbersome. In this section I will demonstrate the centrality of these
assumptions; in the following section, I will attempt to refute them.
The assumption that elitist bargaining is inevitable merely reflects the
general insistence of the industrial relations scholarship of the 1950's that
elitist structures were inevitable in industrial relations and that industrial
relations scholarship was therefore properly concerned primarily with the
identification and taxomony of such elites. This reflected a more general
assumption of political science in the 1950's that elitism was both desira-
ble and inevitable.1 32 The most sweeping of such industrial relations anal-
yses argued that a universal trait of industrializing societies "is the inevi-
table and eternal separation of industrial men into managers and the
managed." ' 3
As applied to the internal organization of unions, this straight-line use
of Michel's Iron Law of Oligarchy"" yielded obvious results:
As for contract negotiations and important strike actions, the worker
must rely on the intelligence and honesty of persons delegated to re-
present him, and these delegates in turn must authorize a still
smaller group (usually the national officers) to act for the union
... .Power in many unions tends to gravitate to the top."'
tively more information than members, and surely are embarrassed by contract rejection. The distinc-
tion made by the authors seems to reflect only a continuing latent hostility to units of employees
"scattered" (as though this were the fault of the employees) among several plants or companies. Note
also the interesting locution "collective bargaining would profit," as if some reified collective bargain-
ing could profit, rather than capitalists. At moments like this, the Karl Marx of Capital meets the
Sigmund Freud of The Psychopathology of Eveiyday Life.
132. See P. BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM: A CRITIQUE (1967).
133. C. KERR, J. DUNLOP, F. HARBISON & C. MYERS, INDUSTRIALISM AND INDUSTRIAL MAN:
THE PROBLEMS OF LABOR AND MANAGEMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH 15 (1960). The authors'
taxonomy of elites (dynastic, middle class, revolutionary intellectuals, colonial administrators, and na-
tionalist leaders) is presented id. at 47-76. The orientation toward elites pervades the authors' final
report on the project of which Industrialism and Industrial Man was a part. The authors saw the
"absolutely central aspect of any process of industrialization to be the rise to power of the 'elite' which
comes to dominate it." C. KERR, J. DUNLOP, F. HARBISON & C. MYERS, INTER-UNivERsrrY
STUDY OF LABOR PROBLEMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, INDUSTRIALISM AND INDUSTRIAL MAN
RECONSIDERED: SOME PERSPECTIVES ON A STUDY OVER Two DECADES OF THE PROBLEMS OF
LABOR AND MANAGEMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH 41; see id. 10-13 (1975). For a critique of the
studies, and also the best short introduction to American industrial relations scholarship in the 1950's,
See J. COCHRANE, INDUSTRIALISM AND INDUSTRIAL MAN IN RETROSPECT. A CRITICAL REVIEW OF
THE FORD FOUNDATION'S SUPPORT FOR THE INTER-UNIVERSITY STUDY OF LABOR (1979).
134. "Who says organization, says oligarchy." R. MICHELS, POLrICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGI-
CAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 365 (1962).
135. Pierson, The Government of Trade Unions, 1 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 593, 595 (1948). In
hindsight it is not only possible but necessary to distinguish two positions that the literature of this
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A second dominant-but undemonstrated-assumption of both cases
and industrial relations literature is that collective bargaining is already as
democratic as possible in two senses, given the constraints of inevitable
elitism. First, negotiators are responsive to the dictates of internal union
political processes. Second, these processes are democratic because all
viewpoints within the union have a chance to be heard that is proportion-
ate to their numerical strength among the rank and file. This model, too,
represents a great model of 1950's political science writ small. Just as the
model of a general and inevitable elitist collective bargaining reflected as-
sumptions of a general and inevitable political elitism, this model of repre-
sentative democracy in collective bargaining reflects the then-dominant
ideology of political pluralism. Without analysis of actual union political
processes concerning collective bargaining, it was easy to assume that ab-
stract pluralism told the whole story. The members could all express their
views; the leaders would reflect those views or be voted out of office.1"'
The preference for elitist bargaining rested on more than the beliefs
that extant elites were representative and that further representation was
infeasible. The status quo was affirmatively desirable. Many felt that
union leaders were considerably more reasonable and conciliatory than the
insatiable rank and file. As Archibald Cox put it (attributing the insight
to "the sophisticated exponents" of "one view"): "[Slince union officials
have better training and more experience than rank and file members,
those officials who are given the power will act more responsibly in en-
forcing the union's obligations to employers, will present fewer preposter-
ous or impractical demands and, if allowed the power, will enforce their
decisions."137 Consequently, the argument ran, a decision for democratic
collective bargaining was a decision for wage inflation. Cox quoted John
T. Dunlop on the enaction of the LMRDA: "The country has chosen on
the grounds of morality and democracy to make wage stability more diffi-
cult to achieve.
'138
period tended to conflate. I will argue that collective bargaining in the late 1940's and 1950's did
indeed see an enormous concentration of bargaining authority into the hands of union elites. See infra
pp. 837-40. Those who, like myself, believe that democratic unionism is possible argue that the rem-
edy for this elitism is democracy. In contrast, much of the industrial relations scholarship just dis-
cussed assumed that the growth of elitism was inevitable and that democracy was consequently infea-
sible (an assumption which the courts have internalized). One influential work, for example,
attempted to prove, through analysis of a "deviant" case, that unions, for various far from unalterable
reasons relating largely to the sociology of work organization and the resultant limited opportunities
for employees to form social groups or even communicate, could never be democratic. See S. LIPsET,
M. TRow & J. COLEMAN, UNION DEmocRAcY: THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION (1956).
136. See D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 77-79 (1970) (dis-
cussing pluralist model).
137. Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L.
REV. 819, 829-30 (1960).
138. Id. For works arguing that union officials are more reasonable than the membership, see D.
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Finally, democracy and broad participation in the collective bargaining
process "usually entails delays."13 9 "At the bargaining table, the strong
political pressures within the union create obvious problems whenever the
wishes of the majority collide with the public interest in avoiding unneces-
sary strikes or inflationary wage settlements."140
While I cannot demonstrate the direct influence of these four assump-
tions on the course of judicial decisions concerning democracy in collective
bargaining, I hope the reader will be convinced, as I have become, how
much they explain the curious, inarticulate refusal of the courts to extend
recognized norms of union democracy into collective bargaining. If democ-
racy is only granted to workers as a policy decision, as a means of advanc-
ing greater national interests, courts will let the burden rest on those who
advocate the extension of democracy. If the courts are convinced that dem-
ocratic bargaining is infeasible, unnecessary, inflationary, and cumber-
some, they would be reluctant indeed to help foster democratic bargaining.
Since these assumptions are indeed widely shared, the proponent of demo-
cratic bargaining must be prepared to challenge them.
III. A PLEA FOR DEMOCRATIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
A. Democratic Collective Bargaining Is Required by the LMRDA
The primary legal guarantor of union democracy is the LMRDA's Bill
of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations."" Section 101(a)(1) grants
union members "equal rights and privileges. . . to participate in the de-
liberations and voting upon the business of [membership] meetings
. . "142 Section 101(a)(2) grants members the rights of speech and as-
Box & J. DUNLOP, supra note 136, at 87; S. SuCHTF.R, UNION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL MAN-
AGEMENT 374-383 (1941); Aaron, The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
73 HARV. L. REV. 851, 906 (1960); Barbash, The Causes of Rank-and-File Unrest, in TRADE
UNION GOVERNMENT AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 56 (J. Seidman ed. 1970); Pierson, supra note
135, at 596 ("[Tihe more democratic the union, the more extreme its demands and tactics vis-a-vis
employers are likely to be .... ").
139. Peterson, Management Efficiency and Collective Bargaining, I INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
29 (1947).
140. D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, supra note 136, at 87; see also Jacobs, Union Democracy and the
Public Good-Do They Necessarily Coincide?, 25 COMMENTARY 68 (1956) (arguing that making
unions democratic would lead to featherbedding and the pursuit of other economic interests inimical to
the public good); Lipset, The Law and Trade Union Democracy, 47 VA. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1961)
(attributing similar views to "critics" of union democracy).
The decline in the use by European unions of ratification referenda on new collective agreements
was attributed to their "fundamental inconsistency with any coordination or systematic planning of
wage policy on an industry-wide or economy-wide scale," as well as to "the failure of a large part of
the electorate to vote, thus giving dedicated minority groups influence far beyond their numerical
strength." W. GALENSON, TRADE UNION DEMocRACY IN WSTERN EUROPE 77 (1961).
141. LMRDA §§ 101-105, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1976).
142. LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1976).
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sembly.14 s These sections have supplied the basis for the line of cases
mentioned above, which require internal union referenda to be fair, clear,
unmanipulative, and in accord with the union's constitution and by-
laws." The sections contain no exemption for meetings or referenda on
collective bargaining issues or on contract ratification. Indeed, § 101(a)(1)
speaks generally of "the business of such meetings," and § 101(a)(2)
guarantees the right to express views "upon any business properly before
the meeting." Some courts have held that these sections apply to collective
bargaining in the same way as they do to any other union business.
1 45
Nevertheless, in practice, as we have seen, the norms applied are not the
same; elitism in bargaining is more readily tolerated than in other ar-
eas. 148 One possible justification for this distinction would be that the
Congress which enacted the LMRDA desired such a distinction. Exami-
nation of the legislative history, however, reveals that Congress was aware
of the existence of elitist bargaining, feared its association with union
crime and corruption, and enacted the LMRDA to address the problem.
The LMRDA was in fact largely a response to the sordid incidents of
corruption in some unions revealed by the Senate Select Committee Inves-
tigations on Improper Activities in the Labor Management Field (the Mc-
Clellan Committee). Although much of this corruption concerned matters
outside collective bargaining, such as misuse of members' dues, a good
deal of the evidence before the McClellan Committee exposed the corrup-
tion from elitist bargaining. The Committee heard accounts of union elites
entering into sweetheart contracts that were highly disadvantageous to
employees. 147 Committee members repeatedly noted the absence of demo-
cratic bargaining procedures,1 48 implicitly suggesting that such procedures
143. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976).
144. See supra p. 816.
145. See supra note 59.
146. See supra pp. 808-29.
147. See, e.g., Investigation of Improper Activity in the Labor Management Field, Hearings
Before the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor Management Field, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5841 (1957) (statement of Iris Jensen, Secretary-Treasurer of Local 449, Bakery &
Confectionary Workers Union, Webster City, Iowa) (after recognition of union favored by employer,
contract signed providing only five cents annual wage increase); id. at 5532 (testimony of Clinton
Lewis) (union contract for sole purpose of having union dues sent to teamster officials; no union
contact with affected employees or improvement in working conditions).
148. See id. at 5844-45 (statement of Iris Jensen):
SENATOR MCNAMARA. You say that they did vote on the approval of the contract at this
rank and file meeting?
MRS. JENSEN. A number of people did sign a paper accepting the contract. I believe that
is what it was.
SENATOR McNAMARA. Who signed the contract in the original instance for the employ-
ees? Do you know? . . . [Ilt is signed by International Vice President George Stuart.
MRS. JENSEN. That is right.
SENATOR McNAMARA. But he did this without taking it up with you people who were
the employees of the plant, apparently. This was all done before you held this union meeting
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might stop corrupt bargaining. Other abuses of elitist bargaining also fig-
ured prominently in the testimony. Committee members heard, for exam-
ple, how individuals' exclusive authority to negotiate contracts under elit-
ist structures had been misused for personal financial gain.
1 49
As is well known, the legislation that emerged from these hearings, the
LMRDA, attempted to end such corruption, in part through the device of
guaranteeing union members the right to participate in union affairs. In
view of the weight of the testimony showing that elitist bargaining was
frequently associated with personal corruption, one can assume that Con-
gress intended that the guarantees of equal rights and freedom of speech
and assembly extend to bargaining and ratification meetings and
referenda.
The statement by one of the bill's chief sponsors that it was not about
collective bargaining 5" must be seen in context. This position served as an
argument against what became Title VII, dealing with union unfair labor
you are talking about?
MRS. JENsEN. That is right, sir.
SENATOR MCNAMARA. And this contract was presented to you and you were told that the
International Vice President, Mr. Stuart, had agreed to this contract?
MRS. JENSEN. Yes, that is right.
Id. at 5848:
SENATOR CURTIS. How many members did the bakers' confectionary workers have when
the contract was signed?
MRS. JENSEN. I don't know the number. It must have been about 150, I guess.
SENATOR CURTIS. But none of them had anything to do with the negotiations for the
contract?
MRS. JENSEN. Not that I know of, sir.
SENATOR CURTIS. Did the local union ratify the contract at a later time, after it was
signed?
MRS. JENSEN. Not that I know of.
SENATOR CURTIS. In other words, the workers never have had anything to say about that
contract, is that right?
MRS. JENSEN. No; they have not.
149. See id. at 2685 (statement of Joseph Tenczar):
SENATOR MCNAMARA. What if an employer did not buy a [banquet] ticket? Did all em-
ployers buy a ticket?
MR. TENCZAR. Not necessarily. I know one thing, that if the employer didn't buy, we
were given strict orders on the executive board of local 3 that, if we could not get an employer
to buy anything, give it over to a team, and a team was set up especially for this reason in the
event I went to an employer and he refused me. I could report to this team, and the team
would go out and see what they could do.
SENATOR McNAMARA. Did the team do any different than what you did?
MR. TENCZAR. I suppose they went in and said, "Listen, Max Kralstein is an interna-
tional Vice President, you know, and he negotiates the contracts in the City of New York, and
he has been doing it for the last 4 or 5 years, and maybe he will give you a break, I don't
know." It could be one of those things.
150. See 105 CONG. REc. 884 (1959) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("This is primarily a labor-
management reform bill, dealing with the problems of dishonest racketeering-it is not a bill on
industrial relations, dealing with the problems of collective bargaining and economic power. The two
areas of legislation should not be confused or combined."), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE LMRDA 968 (1959).
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practices such as organizational picketing and secondary boycotts; the ar-
gument against the provision failed and Title VII became part of the
LMRDA. Conservatives expressly wanted to extend democracy to such
aspects of collective bargaining as strike votes; their views were rejected.151
Other members of Congress simply assumed that the legislation would
open up collective bargaining to membership participation.
152
There is thus nothing in the LMRDA's legislative history that provides
any comfort for the latent judicial assumption that elitist bargaining might
be a permissible exception to union democracy.
B. Democratic Collective Bargaining Is Necessary
The reader who bore with me during the long trek through the case
law may marvel at the purpose of this section. It is true that the collection
of cases seeking democracy in collective bargaining reveals a sorry specta-
cle of appointed business agents and remote officers agreeing to contracts
already rejected by affected workers, unacceptable to them, or rushed past
them in secrecy or mendacity. However, it is important to remember that
appellate cases are deficient even as reports about what happened in the
particular case; as a representative sample of a social practice, they are
utterly useless.153 Indeed, the reports can give no indication of whether the
shocking displays of elitism in these cases are the norm for the American
labor movement or merely a small sample of deviant cases. I would there-
fore like to survey what little is known about normal levels of democracy
in the collective bargaining process. I hope to show that the average em-
ployee is significantly disadvantaged by the bureaucratic elitism of the
normal process of collective bargaining and that these employees would
151. At least four Congressmen introduced union democracy bills during the 1958 session that
would have required votes before strikes: S. 1002, § 2, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mundt); H.R. 4473, §
102(c)(5) (Barden); H.R. 7265, § 109 (Kearns); H.R. 1103 (Bentley). The advocates were conserva-
tives, and the rationale was the same as that of LMRA §§ 203(c) and 209(b): that reasonable rank-
and-file members were being forced into striking by voracious union leaders. The bills were justified
by their supporters on grounds of both principle and policy, sometimes in the same speech. E.g., 105
CONG. REC. 6688-89 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Eastland), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE LMRDA 1215-16 (1959). The proposal finally came to a vote as an amendment by
Eastland and was defeated 28-60; the votes recorded in favor were cast by ordinarily conservative
Senators. See 105 CONG. REc. 6690 (1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LMRDA 1217 (1959).
152. The only reference to contract ratification that I have been able to locate in the LMRDA's
legislative history is the concern of Senator Lausche that what became NLRA § 8(0, 29 U.S.C. §
158(0 (1976), would permit a contractor and union business agent to make an agreement without the
consent of the employees. 105 CONG. REG. 6398 (1959). Senator Lausche was apparently unaware
that the right to ratify a collective agreement was guaranteed neither in existing federal labor law nor
in any legislation before Congress that year.
153. See P. SHUCHMAN, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 79-83 (1979).
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benefit from the use of the law to encourage democratic collective
bargaining.1
54
It seems clear that the dominant social trend of postwar collective bar-
gaining has been toward greater concentration of authority in the hands of
the few. Local bargaining gave way to national bargaining in the 1950's
and seems never to have regained any of the vitality it lost.15 5 But one
must interpret this fact with care. National control does not totally pre-
clude democracy (except in some highly participatory Rousseauist sense);
local control hardly guarantees it.156 As I argued above, there has been no
congressional policy to favor or oppose the growth of national bargain-
ing,157 and it would therefore be improper to attempt to use union democ-
racy law opportunistically to roll back the institution of national bargain-
ing. 58 Nevertheless, it is undeniable that one effect of bargaining in large
units is to make the process less participatory and less democratic. As a
general matter, political life in union locals is considerably more vibrant,
with greater participation by union members and more frequent turnover
in office than at the national level.159 Thus, a move from local to national
154. This discussion is necessarily general, and I have, perhaps unfairly, combined examples from
many different unions. This reflects both a lack of detailed attention by social scientists to how indi-
vidual unions actually bargain, see infra note 181, and the modesty of my project here, which is
merely to establish that courts should generally treat seriously charges of undemocratic bargaining,
and that such practices are not confined to a mere two or three unions. Specific elitist bargains and
specific remedies should be addressed judicially on a case-by-case basis. In my view, the existing
evidence certainly would not support, for example, detailed congressional imposition of uniform union
bargaining procedures.
155. See J. EDELSTEIN & M. WARNER, COMPARATIVE UNION DEMOCRACY: ORGANIZATION
AND OPPOSITION IN BRITISH AND AMERICAN UNIONS 20-21 (1975); Macdonald, Collective Bar-
gaining in the Postwar Period, 20 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 553, 561-65 (1967); Shister, The
Direction of Unionismn 1947-1967: Thrust or Drift?, 20 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 578, 595 (1967).
A particularly early identification of this trend appears in Pierson, The Government of Trade Unions,
1 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 593, 605 (1948).
156. See F. NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE: ESSAYS IN POUT-
rCAL AND LEGAL THEORY 224 (1957). The assumption of such a relationship would be a good
example of what Neumann called "constitutional fetishism, the attribution of political functions to
isolated constitutional arrangements which have meaning only in a total cultural, and particularly
social setting." Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 926 n.87
(1953).
157. See supra notes 121-22.
158. One questions the spirit behind the recent call of the Heritage Foundation for "new legisla-
tion that would enable workers at the local union level to veto nationwide, multi-employer bargaining
agreements and to opt instead for collective bargaining over which they would exert direct control."
Antosh, Workers Rights in Labor Law, in AGENDA '83 (Heritage Foundation 1983), summarized in
112 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 91 (1983). I see this as a classic example of an unprincipled concession to
"democracy," intended solely to achieve some other policy goal. Like other efforts in this direction by
political conservatives, see supra pp. 797-98, there is good reason to doubt that this would have the
effect its sponsors hope for. See Local 472, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumb-
ing & Pipefitting Indus. v. Georgia Power Co., 684 F.2d 721 (11th Cir. 1982) (international, at
employer request, breaks up jurisdiction of militant local).
159. See generally Hartley, The Framework of Democracy in Union Government, 32 CATH. U.L.
REV. 13, 82-88 (1982) (reviewing literature on political participation in local unions); id. at 62-82
(national union political processes).
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bargaining is necessarily a move from relative democracy to relative elit-
ism. The cure for this elitism is not necessarily more local control, but
rather the use of the law to encourage democratic bargaining at every
level.
The concentration of bargaining power in the few instead of the many
has occurred even in locals, draining power from elected representatives to
paid staff.160 Bargaining only by appointed or national officials obviously
precludes participatory democracy. A believer in the feasibility and desira-
bility of representative democracy, with union officers and staff as repre-
sentatives, would be less concerned. Not as much is known as one might
suppose about the attitudes of union officers. 61 What is known, however,
suggests that contemporary collective bargaining is a very far cry from
even representative democracy.
In the first place, union officers are imperfectly representative of their
constituencies. Union leaders generally come disproportionately from
older, more experienced, more skilled, and more highly paid workers.' 2
160. Staff experts in America appear to play a role in contract negotations unique to this country.
See J. EDELSTEIN & M. WARNER, supra note 155, at 12; Barbash, Rationalization in the American
Union, in ESSAYS IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS THEORY 147 (G. Somers ed. 1969); Shirom, Union
Use of Staff Experts: The Case of the Histadrut, 29 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 107, 118-120 (1975)
(comparative study); see also Cook, Dual Government in Unions: A Tool for Analysis, 15 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 323, 331 (1962) (describing tension in locals administering multiple contracts be-
tween elected officers and appointed business agents, who frequently run collective bargaining, negoti-
ate, file grievances, and thus become true leaders of local in members' eyes). The willingness of ap-
pointed construction union staff to grant employees ad hoc relief from ratified agreements is so
widespread as to have a name, "business agent concessions." D.Q. Mills, Speech to Nat'l Convention,
Mechanical Contractors' Ass'n, Feb. 9, 1984 (reported at 115 LAB. RFL. RPrR. (BNA) 193-94
(Mar. 5, 1984)).
Some cures for this problem may be as bad as the disease. Cook attributes the common practice in
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters-under which one individual simultaneously holds multi-
ple positions as local business agent, president of a district council, member of a statewide bargaining
conference, and international vice-president-to the need to "find a meeting place between national
direction of bargaining and regional negotiation." Id. at 338. For the truly nauseating piling-up of
multiple salaries, fringe benefits, and perquisites that the elite reaps in this search for a "meeting
place," see TEAMSTER DEMOCRACY AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A PROD REPORT (1976), or
almost any issue of Convoy Dispatch, the newspaper of the Teamsters for a Democratic Union (par-
ticularly the regular column "Your Dues Pay For This?").
161. In many ways, C. Wright Mills' account of the recruitment, backgrounds, outlook, and con-
sciousness of union leaders remains unsurpassed. See C. MILLS, THE NEW MEN OF PoWER:
AMERICA's LABOR LEADERS (1948).
162. Leonard Sayles and George Strauss provide a vivid example:
Lower-paid workers are sometimes completely unrepresented [in union leadership]. In one
manufacturing plant, the coalheavers were without a steward of their own, although many
smaller groups had separate representation. The steward who had jurisdiction over them made
no reference to their grievances until directly questioned by the interviewer, when he said,
"Oh, yes, I'm in charge of them too, but they don't cause me any trouble." When asked how
he found out what their grievances were, since he worked in a different part of the plant, he
said, "Well, I suppose they'd get a message to me somehow. I don't know-it hasn't come up
yet."
L. SAYLES & G. *STRAUSS, THE LOCAL UNION 83 (rev. ed. 1967).
Collective Bargaining
The underrepresentation of black, female, and other ethnic minority
workers is well known."'
This skewed representation has consequences beyond the self-evident
ones. American labor markets can best be modeled as discrete "internal
labor markets." Once a worker gains entry into a particular "internal"
market, intermarket mobility is rare;1 64 initial job entry thus brings with
it highly correlated conditions. Workers underrepresented in union leader-
ship will on the whole be those who receive lower pay, and who face more
disagreeable working conditions. For example, these workers are most
likely to be injured in an industrial accident. As a result of their under-
representation, union members' concern with health and safety issues are
unlikely to be accurately reflected by union negotiators.16 5
Perhaps because of this inadequate representation, union negotiators
often do not reflect the aspirations and priorities of their constituents. 66
Since this information is readily accessible to these officers, their igno-
rance is largely self-imposed and in many cases stems from elitist and
hostile attitudes toward the union's members.1 67 Moreover, appointed staff
negotiators are necessarily responsive only to union leadership since they
may be easily replaced.168
163. Goldberg, Affirmative Action in Union Government: The Landrun-Griffin Act hnplications,
44 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 652-55 (1983); Klare, supra note 50, at 163, and sources cited therein.
164. P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS
(1971).
165. L. BACOW, BARGAINING FOR JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH 95-96 (1980).
166. The text of Lawler & Levin, Union Officers' Perceptions of Members' Pay Preferences, 21
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 509 (1968), reports close agreement among officers' predictions, officers'
preferences, and members' preferences. Examination of their data, however, id. at 514, reveals some
very wide gaps. "The officers tend to greatly overestimate the members' desire for additional cash
.... " Id. at 515. The members' actual preference was half the predicted level; members actually
ranked increased wages below sick leave. Officers overestimated the members' preferences for a
shorter workweek by a factor of two and underestimated members' preferences for increased vacations
and increased holidays by a factor of three. Not a single officer predicted members' significant prefer-
ence for early retirement.
Another study revealed similarly poor predictions by union officers of their members' preferences:
[A]lthough officers and members of our samples seemed in basic agreement concerning union
goals, there was a particularly interesting and perhaps significant difference between them.
Higher wages ranked second in relative importance as a perceived goal among the officers, as
revealed by the number of times officers mentioned it; higher wages ranked only ninth in
relative importance as a goal which members thought should be sought.
R. MILLER, F. ZELLER & G. MILLER, THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL UNION LEADERSHIP: A STUDY OF
FIVE LOCAL UNIONs 54 (1965).
167. Miles and Ritchie found that union leaders do not believe that participation will improve
decisions, and see participation as valuable only in potentially improved morale and greater rank-and-
file acceptance of leadership decisions. Miles & Ritchie, Leadership Attitudes Among Union Officials,
8 INDUS. REL 108, 110-11 (1968). Union officials tend to rate rank-and-file members lower in capa-
bility than do the managerial counterparts of the officials. Id. at 115.
While union officials have a low view of members, they have a much higher view of fellow officers.
Landsberger & Hulin, A Problem for Union Democracy: Officers' Attitudes Toward Union Members,
14 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 419 (1961).
168. See Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431 (1982). For an example of replacing elected with ap-
pointed bargaining representatives in order to further the leadership's goals at the expense of the
The Yale Law Journal
Bargaining with management exacerbates the effect of union officers'
unrepresentativeness, ignorance, and hostility. As a general matter, negoti-
ators who work on a continuing basis with counterparts from the other
side become less aggressive than their principals. 16 9 In addition, "negotia-
tors may on occasion be effective in achieving intergroup resolution by
employing various tactics for limiting the role of group members in inter-
group decision making." 170 While these truisms suggest an inevitable con-
flict of interest between negotiators and members, there are many tech-
niques for handling this conflict. The resolution takes very different forms
under democratic and elitist bargaining. Under democratic bargaining, the
negotiator has an incentive to be honest from the beginning about what
might be attained, to use superior knowledge and rational argument to
persuade members to adopt attainable demands, and to permit intraor-
ganizational opponents to participate in policymaking so as to win them
over to the leadership's view. The elitist bargainer, who need not answer
so directly to constituents but who must face periodic elections, 171 has
other techniques at his disposal. The members may be kept in the dark;
1 7
2
they may actually be lied to about the contents of the tentative agree-
ment; 1 3 their demands may be silently dropped and nothing put into
writing;11 4 or they may be met with appeals to the personal prestige or
power of the leadership or actual payoffs to influential members of the
rank and file.175
Industrial relations scholars have not done sufficient empirical work to
reveal which of these models is more common, or in what proportion they
may be found in typical collective bargaining.17 6 In the absence of such
membership's goals, see 97 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 259-60 (March 17, 1978) (suit by bricklayers in
New York to block contract, cutting their pay, that was signed after union president replaced elected
representatives on negotiating committee with business agents).
169. R. WALTON & R. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS 286
(1965).
170. Id. at 286 n.8.
171. LMRDA § 401(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C. § 481 (a)-(b) (1976).
172. See Warehouse Union, Local 860, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1022, 1023
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (union fails to inform members of employer's plans).
173. See Anderson v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 641 F.2d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1981) (mis-
representing existence of paid fund for severance pay).
174. See Hidden Changes in Kroger Master Language, Convoy Dispatch, Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 10:
When the Kroger master contract was extended earlier this year, everyone working for Kroger
believed there was not going to be a single change in the master language. . . .Well, guess
what. Members who have scrutinized the new contract have discovered that language was
added to Article 25 (Subcontracting) to the master contract-the addition of the date May 31,
1979-which limits who is protected by the subcontracting clause. Not a single Business Agent
or union official will claim any knowledge of or responsibility for how this date got in the
contract.
175. See R. WALTON & R. MCKERSIE, supra note 169, at ch. IX ("Intraorganizational Bargain-
ing Tactics"); McKersie, Perry & Walton, Intraorganizational Bargaining in Labor Negotiation, 9
J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 463 (1965).
176. The most detailed study is limited to written union constitutions and does not examine actual
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work, I would like to reprint an account of a strike vote that I have reason
to believe (though cannot prove) is typical. The setting is the United
States Steel Corporation's Gary Works, one of the nation's largest steel
plants, in July 1971:17
I only learn about the strike vote meeting from a radical friend
who works in the coke ovens. No one else in Merchant Mills seems
to know a thing about it, so I call up the union, and a voice says
impatiently, "Yes the strike vote is Tuesday. Everybody's been in-
formed." I tell her that not a damn person in Merchant Mills knows
about it, and she promises that the union will look into this. That
night I see there's one dim leaflet tacked up in the glass case by the
foreman's office. I try to talk the meeting up, but nobody cares. One
older black guy sums up the feeling pretty well: "What difference?
Meeting, no meeting. Strike, no strike. They going to do it just like
they want anyhow." By "they" he means the union and the
company.
Tuesday. The union hall of Local 1014 of the United Steelwork-
ers of America is packed by the time I arrive, and I have to sit in the
front. (I'm told later that my picture is on the cover of the union
newspaper. But I've never seen our union newspaper.) About 400
people are at the meeting, out of 15,000 members.
Harry Piasecki, the union president, starts by announcing in a
tough and determined voice that the company is going to be real
scared to hear of the big militant turnout at this strike meeting.
From what I hear, this meeting is about eight times bigger than most
local meetings, which means that Piasecki is probably just as scared
as the company right now.
He and other union officials give long empty reports about the
strike talks, and it's obvious they want to drag this thing out until we
practice. Lahne, Union Constitutions and Collective Bargaining Procedures, in TRADE UNION Gov-
ERNMENT AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 167 (J. Seidman ed. 1970). In 1970, Herbert Lahne re-
viewed the national constitutions of 73 national unions with membership above 40,000; these unions
contained roughly 90% of America's unionized workers. While most constitutions specified who was to
authorize, continue, terminate, and finance strikes, fewer specified who was to negotiate and approve
settlements. Fewer than 40% of the constitutions studied, covering just over 40% of the union mem-
bers, required any sort of ratification. Fewer constitutions yet said anything about how to formulate
and agree upon demands. The very vagueness of constitutional provisions of course increases the
interpretive authority of union officers. See Black v. Transportation Workers' Union, 454 F. Supp.
813 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mein., 594 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussed supra note 95); Stelling v.
IBEW, Local 1547, 587 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979), discussed
supra note 65. It also gives the lie to repeated judicial suggestions, see supra p. 810, that democracy in
collective bargaining might meaningfully come about through members' common law suits to enforce
union constitutions.
177. The United Steelworkers of America did not in 1971, and does not now, submit contracts for
membership ratification. See Aikens v. Abel, 373 F. Supp. 425, 432 (W.D. Pa. 1974). As correctly
stated by the union officials quoted, even the strike vote was purely advisory; strikes may be called
only by the international president. Constitution of the International Union, United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO-CLC art. XVI (discussed in L. ULMAN, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STEEL
WORKERS' UNION 49-51 (1962)).
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become confused and bored and hopefully we'll go home. After a
half-hour some of the guys on the floor start to yell out. Piasecki can
see that people want something to happen, so he takes a big sheaf of
papers out of his briefcase and shouts, "Brothers! I hope we are go-
ing to register a big strike-vote here tonight, to give our union lead-
ership the backing they deserve.
"You men know the company is stalling and won't cooperate. And
I'd bet you are wanting to know just how these negotiations stand."
"Yeah. Yeah. Tell us," the shouts ring out.
He begins. "I have a copy of our bargaining position right here. It
has fourteen categories of demands on it, and the company has only
agreed to talk about six of them. That's the kind of bad faith we are
up against."
"What is it?" "What are they offering?" the cries go up.
"Right. Right," says the president. "And I'm going to tell you
exactly what these categories are." He shuffles through these papers
some more, while we wait. Finally he says loudly and decisively,
"Number three!" Then silence, and after more paper shuffling and a
brief consultation with another official sitting at the microphone-cov-
ered table, "Number five! Number six!" Then more silence and
more shuffling, and heads out in the audience are looking back and
forth, and asses are shifting around in their chairs. Eventually he
gets out the rest of the six numbers. Nothing more, just the numbers.
This is union democracy in action. Most of the audience is looking
passive, but a few start to yell out again. "Hey, what's with these
numbers?!" "What are they offering?!" "What's the old age bene-
fit?" "Come on! What's going on?"
The gavel goes rap rap rap and Piasecki says, "O.K. brothers,
let's keep it orderly, every man will have a chance to speak." But the
uproar continues and finally he shouts, "Do you men want to know
what's in those categories?" Obviously they do. So he consults, and
shuffles more papers, and then begins to read out the answers.
"Wages and Hours! Retirement Plans!" He goes on like this, with
the category titles. That's all. Confusion and passivity increase. Some
men yell. Some leave. Most just sit.
Now the microphone on the floor is opened up, but those who ask
good questions don't get answers, and many of the speakers are mi-
nor union officials. They remind us that the union charter doesn't
allow us to vote on the terms of the contract; it only allows us to
authorize Piasecki to call a strike. They talk drivel, but use tough,
labor-movement language: "Brothers and sisters!" "Standing bravely
on the picket line," "We're not going to knuckle under to the god-
dam company until Motherfucking Hell Freezes Over, excuse me if
there are ladies present."
It's getting late, and more people leave. Those who thought this
meeting was actually going to mean something are frustrated and
disappointed. At just the right point, Piasecki calls the vote. "All
right men, how many are in favor of authorizing a strike against this
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company, if the negotiators feel it is necessary? Let's hear it!" There
is a thunderous "Aye." How could you vote anything else? Does
anybody here want to vote in favor of the company? That's what he
seems to ask as he shouts, "Those opposed?" We all look around,
but no hands are raised. How could they be? This is union
democracy.""8
My guess is that the vast majority of the minority of American workers
fortunate enough to be granted the chance to participate in the process of
forming demands or ratifying agreements do so under similar practices as
to notice, information about union and company provisions, meeting pro-
cedure, and voting procedure.""9
I will show in the next section that some American unions have adopted
something more like the model of democratic bargaining. Many have not,
however. The failure of the law to require, let alone enforce, democratic
collective bargaining has left union members subject to the manipulation
of union leaders and negotiators with interests sharply different from
theirs. All too frequently they work under agreements vastly different
from what they would have chosen, without even having been given the
opportunity to voice or implement contrary proposals. The effects of this
process cannot be conclusively demonstrated. One can be certain that, at
178. Packard, Steelmill Blues, LIBERATION, May 1975, at 7, 14, reprinted in 1 THE PUSHCART
PRIZE: BEST OF THE SMALL PRESSES 278, 291-93 (B. Henderson ed. 1976-77) (also in pamphlet
form by Singlejack Books, San Pedro, California). Additional accounts of contemporary Steelworkers'
strike meetings are collected in Lynd, Two Steel Contracts, RADICAL AMERICA, No. 5, at. 41, 53-62
(1971). Aikens v. Abel, 373 F. Supp. 425, 428-31 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (discussed supra note 64), further
demonstrates the undemocratic character of bargaining in the Steelworkers.
179. It is difficult to find reported examples of ratification proceedings with anything like ade-
quate explanation of the issues, reasonable opportunity for opposition, or ballots which permit a fair
sounding of opinion. The ratification procedures of the United Automobile Workers are probably
neither more nor less democratic than those of most unions. McKersie, Perry & Walton, supra note
175, analyzed the bargaining conduct of the UAW in its negotiations with International Harvester in
1961, and though their perspective is the negotiator's rather than the worker's, their fundamental
conclusions were not dissimilar from Packard's:
Union leaders anticipated numerous demands for a more equitable wage structure, which the
company would be unwilling to pay for. In this situation, and given the strong pressure from
within the international union and the company's negotiator for a peaceful negotiation, the
union negotiator adopted the strategy of structuring aspirations so as to minimize conflict from
the outset.
The primary tactic involved limiting the role of the rank and file and local union leaders in
the formulation of classification objectives and proposals.
Id. at 466-67. Ironically, within this basic orientation, bargaining delegates who solicited the views of
their constituencies and adopted a "militant" posture achieved far more of their bargaining objectives
than "those who had acted passively at the time of submissions and who adopted a moderate approach
posture during negotiations." Id. at 477. For a thorough overview of UAW bargaining procedures,
which include some showy democratic elements (rank-and-file representation on the bargaining team)
but are essentially quite elitist, see W. SERRIN, THE COMPANY AND THE UNION: THE "CIVILIZED
RELATIONSHIP" OF THE GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION AND THE UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORK-
ERS (1973). See also Cehaich v. International Union, UAW, 710 F.2d 234, 236 (6th Cir. 1983)
(benefits representative removed from office for opposing tentative collective bargaining agreement).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 93: 793, 1984
best, significant rank-and-file interests-disproportionately the interests of
poorer, younger, and racially disfavored workers-are underrepresented
in collective agreements.18 0 At worst, elitist bargaining facilitates the sort
of sweetheart agreements and union-business collusion and corruption,
that so angered the McClellan Committee.
C. Democratic Collective Bargaining Is Feasible
The advocate of union democracy, like any critic of existing institutions,
is easily placed in a double-bind. To demonstrate a need for change, she
must show the world as it really is, with all the faults of existing institu-
tions. Only this can possibly shake the reader out of the complacency and
inertia that unjust institutions so sedulously cultivate. Having performed
the critique, the critic then frequently finds that she has cut off her own
feet. For has she not also demonstrated that nothing better is possible? If
we think that only if a thing already exists can we be certain that it is
possible, how is change ever achievable?
I have tried to avoid this problem in this Article, through the
strategem-an inherently conservative and accommodationist strategem to
be sure-of limited alms. My model of democratic collective bargaining is
an ideal type. I cannot be certain, and it is indeed unlikely, that any union
anywhere conforms perfectly to the model of democratic collective bar-
180. Several readers have suggested to me that national union leaders during the postwar period
have been substantially more committed to the eradication of employment discrimination and the crea-
tion of job opportunities for minority workers than have been local officials or the rank-and-file gen-
erally. I would concede that, if true, this would be an argument for elitist bargaining. I am unaware,
however, of any empirical evidence for the proposition apart from the unpublished study cited in D.
BOK & J. DUNLOP, supra note 18, at 134.
One purported example of this disparity in attitude, which has been cited to me more than once,
fails to demonstrate it at all. The sweeping alteration of seniority structures in the steel industry
effected by the consent decree approved in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976), is claimed to demonstrate the commitment of the
Steelworkers' leadership to equal opportunity. Three points need to be made. First, Steelworkers'
bargaining has been elitist since the creation of the union. See L. ULMAN, supra note 64, at 10-13,
51-54. The elite that takes credit for the 1974 decree must also take credit for the "sorry picture" of
years of segregation of black workers into the worst jobs. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446
F.2d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 1971). Second, the 1974 consent decree was not prompted by the social con-
science of union leaders. It was not a response to the Montgomery bus boycott, the March on Wash-
ington, and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It was a response to the jolt of decisions like
Bethlehem Steel, 446 F.2d at 659-66, which made it appear for a time that federal courts would order
"rightful place" seniority in employment discrimination cases, and United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1045, 1057-63 (N.D. Ala. 1973), modified, 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976), which awarded substantial back pay awards. Third, while International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (seniority system not unlawful simply be-
cause it perpetuates pre-Civil Rights Act discrimination), makes the Steel Industry Consent Decree
unusually generous relief for victims of employment discrimination, it did not appear that way in
1974. The reported legal proceedings, as the certiorari petition implies, were entirely devoted to attack
on the consent decrees as inadequate relief by attorneys for individual Title VII plaintiffs and for civil
rights organizations such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the National Organization for
Women.
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gaining. Yet, the model of democratic collective bargaining is a very far
cry from a utopian or totalistic critique of American labor relations. Every
element of the ideal model of democratic collective bargaining derives from
some feature of the best existing union practice. While no union may
combine the elements just as the model would have it, democratic collec-
tive bargaining is feasible. Elitist bargaining is not inevitable."' 1
The first requirement of democratic bargaining is that members have
an opportunity to express their views on prospective bargaining demands.
From the standpoint of democracy, the best way to do this is in relatively
unstructured meetings in groups small enough to permit even the shy to
participate, conducted in a way that encourages members to be honest
about their preferred demands. Meetings are preferable since they allow
interaction among members and thus reinforce the idea of wants as social
rather than private. Such meetings are part of the practice of some
unions.182
There are other mechanisms for ascertaining the views of members,
though if relied on exclusively they are less satisfactory insofar as they
adopt the elitist practice of the members informing the elite, rather than
the democratic practice of the members jointly creating their own de-
mands. This criticism, for instance, applies to the practice of Local 770 of
the Retail Clerks International Association, which sent a questionnaire to
the entire membership. The questionnaire was based on an analysis by
the union's research department of the most important economic
problems, and was tabulated and used by the union's executive board.,8
While this is more democratic than not polling the members, it contains
elitist elements. "The questionnaire itself weights the direction of the an-
181. Research on this topic has been crippled by the dearth of attention in the industrial relations
and sociological literatures to how unions actually bargain. Thirty years ago, Arthur Ross bemoaned
the fact that most supposed studies of union bargaining practice reported only on the formal, i.e.,
constitutional, procedures. A. Ross, TRADE UNION WAGE POLICY 37 (1948). It is depressing that,
thirty years later, some of the studies which Ross cites are still leading studies, and the newer work in
the area, such as that cited supra note 176, continues to be obsessed with formal union constitutional
procedures. The empirical work cited in this section is generally around twenty years old. Since I have
been unwilling merely to swap anecdotes, it is difficult to assemble a picture of how unions actually
bargain. While this rather takes the wind out of the sails of the constantly repeated assertion that
elitism is inevitable, it does not provide much of a basis for arguing that democracy is possible.
182. See A. COOK, UNION DEMOCRACY: PRACTICE AND IDEAL 104 (1963) (describing meeting
procedures in Local 6, Hotel and Restaurant Workers, called by author "Local 200"). Such a meeting
is more likely to play the role advocated here if the negotiating committee has not yet been selected.
One union does elect the negotiating committee first, which then holds open meetings for the receipt of
membership demands. Id. at 163.
183. M. HARRINGTON, THE RETAIL CLERKs 49-50 (1962). Local 770 in Los Angeles was then
the "strongest" local in the Retail Clerks. That international union has since merged with the Meat
Cutters to form the United Food and Commercial Workers.
A similar questionnaire has been employed by the International Union, United Automobile Work-
ers. Summers, Ratification of Agreements, in FRONTIERS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 94 (J.
Dunlop & N. Chamberlain eds. 1967).
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swers." 1 " More importantly, the give and take of public debate is elimi-
nated as individuals make private choices in isolation.1 8 5 Ideally, the dem-
ocratic union should combine face-to-face meetings between negotiators
and members with referenda.""8
The second requirement of democratic bargaining is to amalgamate the
membership's demands and form them into priorities for the organization.
This, too, need not be an elitist maneuver. The union's bargaining policy
committee, a mix of top union officers and rank-and-file workers can
draw up a program from the recommendations made at an open national
bargaining conference, and thus present the program to the membership
for a vote.187 One local variant has an elected negotiating committee draw
up proposals based on discussion at open meetings. The membership then
approves the proposals at the same meeting that authorizes the committee
to bargain. 88 In short, while a mass process for combining many mem-
bership expressions into a unified list of priorities may not be practicable,
whatever process is used can be significantly informed, both before and
after, by membership participation.
The selection of negotiators is a third area that offers significant oppor-
tunities for democracy. As indicated, there are unions which elect negoti-
ating committees or require rank-and-file representation. It is not neces-
sary to rely exclusively on officers or, worse yet, staff.
There is also no excuse for the anxiety and confusion with which union
members generally await the results of negotiations, except an elitist de-
sire to keep members in the dark and to slip something by them at the
end. Obviously there are intermittent moments in any negotiation in
which a deal could evaporate on premature notification of a principal, but
such moments are not the whole of negotiation, and in the meantime dem-
184. M. HARRINGTON, supra note 183, at 50.
185. Eileen Willenborg made this point to me.
Even further down this road of elitism is the Swedish Labor Confederation, Landsorganisationer
(LO), which solicits the priorities of a random sample of union members. A. CAREW, DEMOCRACY
AND GOVERNMENT IN EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONS 184 (1976). This even more completely identifies
the questionnaire as informing the elite, rather than forming group solidarity itself. The symbolic
participation of asking every member her views should justify any added expense in tabulation.
186. The proper mix of face-to-face meetings and referenda is a complex question that depends
upon the extent to which members' interests actually conflict. See J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVER-
SARY DEMOCRACY 270-77 (1980). It is unlikely that any one such mix would be appropriate for all
unions or that the law could appropriately be used to resolve such finely tuned questions.
187. This is the recent practice of the oil bargaining sections of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers, which appoints the union's top four officers and eight rank-and-file members to the bar-
gaining policy committee. Oil Workers Begin Preparations for 1982 Contract Bargaining, DAILY
LABOR REPORT (BNA) No. 95, at A-3 (May 18, 1981). Approval is defined as the assent of three-
fourths of the bargaining units, and simultaneously constitutes strike authorization. As the bargaining
program traditionally receives over 90% approval, this procedure can hardly do anything but
strengthen the union in its own eyes and in management's.
188. A. CooK, supra note 182, at 163 (Local 32B, Service Employees Int'l Union).
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ocratic collective bargaining requires information for the membership
about management's demands, priorities, concessions, and attitudes."x 9
Finally, democratic collective bargaining culminates in approval by the
membership of the proposed settlement, following full and honest disclos-
ure of its provisions, strengths, and weaknesses. This means a ratification
process of somewhat longer duration and more careful preparation than is
customary. There seems no really good reason for the speed generally
thought necessary, except possibly where the ratification vote ends a
strike. In that case, for unions whose negotiators have earned and deserve
members' trust, it should be possible for an initial back-to-work vote to be
clearly understood a.s pending the full and complete discussion which true
ratification would ultimately entail. While I cannot cite an example of a
union that currently conducts this kind of careful informing of the mem-
bership, certainly the canard that the membership is incapable of under-
standing such a process is easily dispelled. 90
In short, democratic collective bargaining is feasible. The best union
practice provides ample models for procedures for members to articulate
demands, form bargaining proposals, elect negotiating committees, receive
information, and ratify settlements. 91
189. In the Hotel and Restaurant Workers local described by Cook, negotiators reported regularly
to an elected Wage and Policy Committee, which in turn had discretion to call general membership
meetings for reports to the membership and approval by the membership of appropriate action, such
as a strike. A. COOK, supra note 182, at 104. It is obvious that, far from weakening the union, this
communication would strengthen it; indeed, that is exactly the conclusion that Cook drew, describing
the repeated meetings as "a persuasive display of union power." Id.
Contrast the apathy and confusion that attended even the overwhelming strike call by the manipu-
lated and poorly informed Steelworkers, supra p. 841-43. Plainly the members want this information,
as opinion surveys reveal. Summers, supra note 183, at 94; see also Kochan, How American Workers
View Labor Unions, 102 MONTHLY LAB. REV. , Apr. 1979, at 23, 29 (union members asked to rate
how much effort union should put into various areas chose as most important "handling members'
grievances," "providing more say in union," and "providing more feedback from union" over even
"higher wages" or "improved working conditions").
190. Clyde Summers has concluded:
[T]here is scant evidence that members have voted down a collective agreement because they
were unable to understand either its underlying problems or its complexity . . . . The issues
that most often cause rejection are not the complicated ones which members do not understand,
but the simple ones which they understand all too well.
Summers, supra note 183, at 98.
191. I am not, of course, equating democratic bargaining with these formal democratic proce-
dures, but am merely pointing out that the latter exist. The forms do not guarantee democracy; they
make democracy possible but can be manipulated into its opposite if leaders and members lack a will
to be democratic.
It is interesting to observe how the procedures for rank-and-file participation in the wage
bargain have increasingly become tools for the use of leadership. Originally intended to imple-
ment the final authority of the rank and file, they have gradually undergone a subtle metamor-
phosis, until they have become a means of conditioning the membership, communicating indi-
rectly with the employer, and guarding the flank against rival leadership.
A. Ross, supra note 181, at 41.
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D. Democratic Collective Bargaining Does Not Have the Adverse Effects
Claimed
If I am correct, judicial reluctance to require the same levels of democ-
racy in collective bargaining as in other union actions stems only partly
from a sense that democracy is unimportant, though surely its full impor-
tance is not appreciated, and only partly from a sense that democracy is
infeasible. Courts prefer elitism mainly because they think that democratic
collective bargaining would be cumbersome, inefficient, inflationary, and
destructive of fair representation. This case, however, has not been made.
Nor, I will argue, are those considerations relevant.
1. Democratic Collective Bargaining Is Not Inflationary or Inefficient
I mentioned above the consensus among industrial relations observers
that unions which bargain democratically tend to be more militant and to
achieve higher wage settlements than elitist unions.1"2 If universally true,
this would collapse the debate about democratic bargaining into a pure
question of the distribution of wages. Partisans of workers would favor
democracy; partisans of employers would favor elitism.
I am reluctant, however, to rely on this easy case for democracy. The
empirical evidence for the relationship is much weaker than commonly
supposed. For one thing, there simply are no studies attempting to corre-
late union bargaining achievements with internal structure, so we are
forced to rely on anecdotes. The relationship between high democracy and
high benefits could not be linear; there are too many prominent counter-
examples. To mention two which have figured prominently in this Article,
few American international unions are as democratic in their internal bar-
gaining procedures as the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers,193 and few
are as elitist as the United Steelworkers.1 94 Yet, anecdotally, the Steel-
workers until recent years negotiated wages on the high end of what most
thought possible, while the Oil Workers have negotiated relatively inept
contracts in an industry that could easily have afforded more.
It is thus hard to imagine that greater democracy in collective bargain-
ing would have had any but the most marginal effect on the rate of infla-
tion. In the first place, the standard economic accounts of the effect of
192. See supra notes 138, 140, 179.
193. See supra note 187.
194. The Steelworkers have never permitted members even to ratify agreements, see Aikens v.
Abel, 373 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Pa. 1974), let alone to express their demands or negotiate the contract.
The Steelworkers have recently limited even further those with the right to approve settlements. Rati-
fication will no longer be by the Basic Steel Industry Conference of over six hundred local leaders.
Rather, smaller groups of presidents of locals directly affected by each agreement will ratify it. Bar-
gaining Goals for Steelworkers, 112 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 68, 69 (Jan. 24, 1983); see supra note
64.
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unionism on wages attribute to unionization only the most modest effects
on wages.195 Furthermore, combating inflation by limiting wage increases
may lead to the far worse consequence of diminished industrial growth,1 96
particularly since unionism may result in increased productivity through
increasing returns to age, experience, and even merit.1 97 And in this in-
conclusive debate, it seems far-fetched to suggest that the slight effect of a
shift from elitist to democratic bargaining would have clearer or greater
effects than unionization itself.
Certainly the data I have been able to present on democratic collective
bargaining offer no support for such a theory. It is true that a deafening
consensus among industrial relations scholars holds that national union
leaders, insulated from rank-and-file pressure, are more "reasonable"
than local leaders or the rank and file itself. 9 The problem lies in defin-
ing "reasonable." One would expect democratic collective bargaining to be
more responsive to workers now underrepresented in the bargaining pro-
cess: the young, the poorly paid, minorities, females, and those in hazard-
ous jobs. Yet it is possible that these workers could be accommodated by
shifts within labor's share of national income. In this regard, it is instruc-
tive to recall the studies in which leaders overestimated the membership's
desire for wage increases and missed its desire for other, perhaps less
costly, benefits. 19 In short, it is by no means far-fetched to argue that
democratic collective bargaining might result in increased productivity and
diminished inflation.200
In a larger sense, this inconclusive debate is irrelevant as well. A nation
committed, for whatever reason, to limiting inflation should proceed along
195. H.G. LEwis, UNIONISM AND RELATIVE WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES 193 (1963)
(10-15%); D. MITCHELL, UNIONS, WAGES AND INFLATION (1980) (20-30%); A. REES, THE Eco-
NOM!CS OF TRADE UNIONS 79 (1962) (10-15%); Rees, The Economic Impact of Collective Bargain-
ing in the Steel and Coal Industries during the Post-War Period, 3 PROC. INDUS. REL. RESEARCH
ASS'N 203 (1950) ("very slight" effect on wages resulting from collective bargaining in steel industry
between 1945 and 1948).
196. See Slichter, Economics and Collective Bargaining, in ECONOMICS AND THE POLIC
MAKER (1959).
197. Brown & Medoff, Trade Unions in the Production Process, 86 J. POL. EON. 355 (1978);
Clark, The Inpact of Unionization on Productivity: A Case Study, 33 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 451
(1980); Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, PuB. INTEREST, Fall 1979, at 69.
198. See supra notes 138-39. Dean Wellington criticized this conclusion twenty-six years ago:
Their skepticism [about union democracy] is grounded in a suspicion that undemocratic unions
are likely to be more responsible to the community than democratic ones, or that nonrespon-
sible union officers are as likely to know labor's best interests as directly responsible ones. Both
of these theories are usually-and quite properly-advanced tentatively. As reflections of em-
pirical data, they lack evidentiary support; as naked assertions, persuasiveness.
Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System,
67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1330 (1958) (footnotes omitted).
199. See supra note 166.
200. "When negotiators try to bind employees with an agreement that the latter find unaccept-
able, the employer may obtain neither the productivity nor the peace for which he bargained." Sum-
mers, supra note 183, at 84.
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the same democratic lines I have advocated here. That means securing the
consent of those whose income is to be limited, and doing so as part of an
open and democratic participatory process in which all interests are repre-
sented and in which a national consensus may emerge." 1 I deny utterly
that there can be a meaningful distinction between a public and private
sphere of employment relations, or that domination and hierarchy in the
latter can appropriately be pressed into the service of deceit in the for-
mer.20 2 In short, even if elitist bargaining were some magic institution that
effectively dampened wage demands, in the public interest, it would still
be wrong. More importantly, there is no evidence that this happens; and
it is quite implausible to suppose that it does happen-as conservatives
are fond of saying, "There is no free lunch." Thus, there is no case for
elitist bargaining as a weapon against inflation.
The same analysis applies to the fear that democratic collective bargain-
ing is lengthy, inefficient, and leads to strikes. While there is more evi-
dence for this latter claim than for the assertion that elitism reduces infla-
tion,"' elitism may also lead to strikes .2" The much-studied upsurge in
contract rejections in the late 1960's was initially blamed by the industrial
relations community, with striking unanimity, on the changed bargaining
climate following the LMRDA. 05 On further analysis, however, the re-
jections seemed to be closely correlated with an expanding economy exper-
iencing inflation.2 °0 When demand for labor dropped in the late 1970's
201. There is considerable mainstream evidence that this is the only efficacious way to run a wage
control program. H. CLEGG, How TO RUN AN INCOMES POLICY AND WHY WE MADE SUCH A
MESS OF THE LAST ONE (1971); Dunlop, Wage and Price Controls as Seen by a Controller, 26 LAB.
L.J. 457, 458-60 (1975).
202. Hyde, Economic Labor Law vs. Political Labor Relations: Dilemmas for Liberal Legalism,
60 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1981); see also Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1358 (1982).
203. See Roomkin, Union Structure, Internal Control, and Strike Activity, 29 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 198, 213 (1976).
204. See Packard, supra note 178, at 7-14.
205. Yet the LMRDA said nothing about bargaining. At the time the analysis was made, the
LMRDA had never been applied to a ratification vote. Still, many blamed the "spirit" or "changed
climate" of LMRDA for contract rejections. See, e.g., Macdonald, Collective Bargaining in the Post-
war Period 20 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 553, 566-67 (1967); Seldin, The Law and Practice of
Contract Ratification, 22 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 253 (1959); Shister, The Direction of Unionism
1947-67: Thrust or Drift?, 20 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 578, 593-94 (1967); Simkin, Refusals to
Ratify Contracts, 21 INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 518, 530 (1968).
206. See Odewahn & Krislov, Contract Rejections: Testing the Explanatory Hypotheses, 12 IN-
DUS. REL 289, 294-96 (1973) (arguing that unemployment rates are primary predictor of rejections
of contracts, though rejections also influenced by union members' expectations and perceptions of
current economic situation, particularly comparisons with other establishments and perceptions of
their company's profits); Odewahn & Krislov, The Relationship Between Union Contract Rejections
and the Business Cycle-A Theoretical Approach, 12 NEB. J. ECON. & Bus., Summer 1973, at 23,
35-36.
General theories of union wage behavior emphasizing the importance of members' comparison of
themselves with other employees include W. ATHERTON, THEORY OF UNION BARGAINING GOALS
(1973); H. LEVINSON, DETERMINING FORCES IN COLLEGTIVE WAGE BARGAINING (1966);
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and early 1980's, contract rejection dropped also, despite the continuing
" existence of formal procedures for rejection by the membership and de-
spite increased legal protection for ratification. 07 Thus, the existence of
democratic bargaining procedures can have only the most marginal effect
on membership aspirations or rates of striking. A general policy of grudg-
ing enforcement of democratic union constitutions can hardly be thought
to target the most strike-prone unions, or to exert any real control over
propensity to strike. Once again, one might argue further that employing
union elitism to control strikes is wrong, and that restrictions on strikes
should rise or fall on their own merits. But surely it is an illusion that
elitist bargaining makes a cheap and functional contribution to some kind
of national policy of strike control.208
2. Democratic Collective Bargaining Does Not Deny Fair
Representation
There is no reason to think that, as a general rule, democratic collective
bargaining would be more likely than elitist bargaining to deny fair repre-
sentation. In most cases, democratic representation will be fairer; in
others, irrelevant. Of course, in the absence of studies comparing the fruits
of democratic and elitist negotiations, we are left swapping anecdotes.
Certainly the black employees victimized by union discrimination, who
were the original class to be protected by the duty of fair representation,
are poorly represented in and by union elites.209 One hope of democratic
collective bargaining is greater reflection of the needs of minority groups,
although this hope will not always be realized. In Steele itself, it seemed
irrelevant whether the racist union, which denied blacks admission, was
democratic or not. Under the circumstances, neither union officers nor the
membership would have been likely to represent the black employees. It
cannot be shown, however, that democratic bargaining necessarily causes
Ashenfelter & Johnson, Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity, 59 AM.
ECON. REV. 35 (1969).
Other scholars have advanced even narrower explanations for the increase in contract rejections,
attributing any increase to poor communication in a handful of unions, though the definition of "com-
munication" was a loose one (including such substantive matters as lack of unanimity on the bargain-
ing committee). Burke & Rubin, Is Contract Rejection A Major Collective Bargaining Problem?, 26
INDUS. & LAB. REL Rav. 820 (1973); see also Shair, The Mythology of Labor Contract Rejections, 21
LAB. L.J. 88 (1970) (contract rejection can be reduced by more "communication" between manage-
ment and employees); cf. Odewahn & Krislov, Comment, 28 INDUS. & LAB. Rn. Rav. 439, 440
(1975) (disputing notion of "communications breakdown" as cause of most contract rejections); Burke
& Rubin, Reply, 28 INDUS. & LAB. Ra. RaV. 441, 443 (1975) (adhering to opposite view).
207. See supra pp. 811-13.
208. See Simkin, supra note 205, at 537 (eliminating ratification "would simply channel those
dissatisfactions toward more frequent changes of union leadership with implicit instructions to be
tougher at the next negotiations").
209. See Klare, supra note 50, at 163 & n.17.
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Steele, or even that the union there was democratic. I would call open
union admissions policies part of union democracy.210
Two kinds of cases that might be thought to present a conflict between
democratic representation and fair representation do not actually present
the problem at all. First, there are the cases in which employee referenda
have been held to be a breach of the duty of fair representation-for ex-
ample, those in which employees affected by a seniority merger vote their
individual interests.21' These do not present any substantive problem of
fair representation; fair representation does not require either dovetailing
or endtailing of employees. 2 ' Fair representation problems would be
raised only when the majority's voting of its own interest seems to disad-
vantage a minority which had some expectation, based on past union
practice or union policy documents, of better treatment."' Here, there has
been an unfortunate tendency to treat the decisions of union elites as the
"real" union decisions, and to view the results when the elite "delegates"
decisionmaking to the membership as the breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation. 1 4 This indeed creates a conflict between union democracy and
fair representation, but it is a false and unnecessary conflict.
For example, it has been suggested that union members' decision to
bargain for a new allocation of compensation should be scrutinized more
closely for unfair treatment, while the identical substantive decision, made
by union leadership "removed ... from political influence," should be
free from "judicial interference."1 5 This obviously stands democracy on
its head. Has this distinction anything to recommend it?
If the union has a national policy, or consistent national practice, on the
allocation of such compensation, the courts should normally give it defer-
ence. Not, however, because this policy is "removed" from "political influ-
ence" in any comprehensible sense, but because it is the result of demo-
cratic politics. If the union's membership has carefully studied and then
adopted a proposal after full debate at a representative national conven-
tion, then those deliberations should not be subordinate to the ad hoc
judgment of a single national officer.2"' There may be a substantive case
210. Phalen v. Theatrical Protective Union No. 1, 22 N.Y.2d 34, 42-48, 238 N.E.2d 295,
299-303, 290 N.Y.S.2d 881, 887-93 (Fuld, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968);
Lang, Toward a Right to Union Membership, 12 H.iv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 31 (1977).
211. See NLRB v. General Truck Drivers' Local 315, 545 F.2d 1173, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 1976).
212. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1964).
213. Finkin, supra note 51, at 215-31, meticulously reviews the variations. "A majority may not
expropriate a benefit or interest currently enjoyed by the minority solely to benefit itself." Id. at 215.
214. See supra note 102.
215. Finkin, supra note 51, at 229 (discussing Waiters Union Local 781 v. Hotel Ass'n, 498 F.2d
998, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
216. There may be a case for the officer's judgment, of course, but it has to be made. Perhaps the
union has long been bedevilled by such disputes and, after full and open debate, has democratically
delegated such decisions to a sort of internal umpire. Deference to the officer's decision may well be
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for the small and unpopular minority group, but I see no reason to treat
elite decisionmaking as presumptively normal and proper. The elite is just
as likely to be paying or establishing a political debt: "removed" from
politics hardly seems an apt description of a union elite. There is just no
escape from the problem that differential treatment of constituent groups
may create difficult problems of fair representation, requiring evaluation
of the basis for the unequal treatment. An automatic deference to the deci-
sions of the leadership will, by definition, solve these problems; but it sits
poorly with national policies on union democracy and extracts an extrava-
gant price in autocracy for a modest diminution in caseload. Autocracies
as well as majorities may be tyrannical; when they are tyrannical inside a
union, courts must review their actions. Democratic bargaining necessarily
conflicts with fair representation only if the latter is defined as elite
benevolence.
The second class of cases in which democratic processes have been held
to violate the duty of fair representation concern majority decisions to
squash or to swap an individual's grievance under the collective agree-
ment. 17 These do constitute violations of the duty, but not because of any
inherent problems with democracy. Rather, democracy may not triumph
over vested individual rights, and these include all the provisions of the
collective agreement. 218
I agree that the duty of fair representation plays an important role in
protecting union members from arbitrary union action, whether by demo-
appropriate. What I object to is the denigration of democracy, and the exaltation of elitism, for no
discernible substantive or procedural purpose.
217. NLRB v. General Truck Drivers Local 315, 545 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 1976); Local 13,
Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972).
218. See Finkin, supra note 51, at 236; Leffler, Piercing the Duty of Fair Representation: The
Dichotomy Between Negotiations and Grievance Handling, 1979 U. ILm L.F. 35; Summers, supra
note 98. Despite some disagreement along the way, Professor Finkin and I end up in the same place:
that "a referendum reflective only of a conflict of interest within the unit" does not necessarily im-
peach the duty of fair representation. See Finkin, supra note 51, at 236. I agree with Professor Finkin
that a hypothetical fair referendum by the union in Truck Drivers Local 315, setting layoff policy for
this and all future layoffs, should have been accorded judicial deference. There were two vices, how-
ever, in the actual referendum in that case, which decided layoff policy for only one employer at a
time when specific jobs had already been designated for elimination. The first, emphasized by the
Board majority and the court of appeals, was a strong flavor that the process was not contract-making
for the future but rather contract interpretation for the instant case only. General Truck Drivers
Local 315, 217 N.L.R.B. 616 (1975). In such a case, Professor Summers' analysis comes into play,
and majority rule may not deprive an individual of her contractual rights. See Summers, supra note
98, at 266-70. The second vice, emphasized by Professor Finkin, was that the referendum
denied some the right to bump while leaving the resolution of the rights of others open. This
distinction rested upon no consideration relevant to bargaining other than the majority's desire
to favor itself by not allowing Holman to bump while hedging its bets against the possibility of
more widespread layoffs in the future.
Finkin, supra note 51, at 235-36. The fact, however, that a union can manipulate an apparently
democratic form to reach an unfair result, as in Truck Drivers, hardly shows that true democracy
would be likely to have similar effects.
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cratic or authoritarian unions. This implies some scope for finding some
union bargaining procedure "unfair," and this occurs, as I showed above,
when certain autocratic actions (such as stuffing ballot boxes or ignoring
constitutional procedures) can confidently be described as arbitrary or un-
fair.2" 9 The regulation of internal union processes is, however, primarily
the function of the LMRDA, which clearly supports union democracy.
The theme of some cases on the duty of fair representation, beginning
with the first,220 is that fair representation in contract negotiation may
require a little union elitism. This assertion has no empirical support and
should be abandoned. The members, not the elite, are the unions; the so-
lutions to union unfairness, if any, are fairness and more democracy, not
elitism.
CONCLUSION: IMPLEMENTING DEMOCRATIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The policy prescriptions that follow from the foregoing are obvious, but
should perhaps be summarized. Most generalize from existing precedent;
only one might require statutory change.
A. The General Principle of Union Democracy
Courts, the NLRB, and other policymakers ordinarily should assume
that collective bargaining is the democratic process of involving employees
in the self-determination of their working conditions. Formulations like
the "delegation" of bargaining power to the leadership are solecisms.
B. Formation of Bargaining Demands
1. Union members have equal rights with the leadership to participate
in the articulation and formation of bargaining demands. A union that
does not solicit membership views violates both the equal rights and free
speech provisions of the LMRDA.221
2. Meetings and referenda on bargaining policy are subject to the
219. See supra pp. 820-22. All conflicts beween collective bargaining and fair representation dis-
appear if one accepts the recent contention that there simply is no "intelligible general rule of distrib-
utive or procedural fairness that may be interposed by a court to overrule the discretionary decisions
made by a union in bargaining for its constitutents." Freed, Polsky & Spitzer, Unions, Fairness and
the Conundrums of Collective Choice, 56 S. CAL. L. Rav. 461, 463 (1983). Unfortunately for this
easy solution and fortunately for the duty of fair representation, the authors have not established their
claim. See Hyde, Can Judges Identify Fair Bargaining Procedures?, 57 S. CAi. L. Rav. 415 (1984)
(arguing that the few reported cases in which judges apply the duty of fair representation to union
bargaining procedures represent uncontroversial theories of fairness).
220. See Klare, supra note 50, at 189-90 (commenting on Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323
U.S. 192 (1944)).
221. LMRDA § 101(a)(1), (2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1), (2) (1976); see Farmer v. Local 1064,
Hotel Workers, 99 L.R.R.M. 2166, 2168-69, 2186 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
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same level of judicial supervision as other meetings and referenda. Meet-
ings must be orderly enough to permit statements of opposing views; bal-
lots must not be one-sided but must genuinely permit expression of mem-
bership views.
C. Ratification
Ratification of proposed agreements should be seen as a right of the
membership. While this arguably would require statutory change,22 the
best argument for such a right, absent such change, follows.
1. Union officials have a fiduciary obligation to secure to the extent
possible, the substantive bargaining goals of the membership. Of course,
some disappointment of the members is inevitable. As noted above, how-
ever, courts have held that ratification of settlements by the membership
cures the failings of their leaders. 22 ' To this end, the union's negotiators
must submit all proposed contracts to the membership for ratification.
Moreover, refusal to submit contracts to ratification denies the member-
ship rights equal to the leaders' to participate in deliberations on union
business, in violation of LMRDA § 101(a)(1) and (2).
2. Ratification must be accompanied by adequate, accurate informa-
tion. Material misrepresentations render any ratification null and void
and require resubmission.
3. Opponents of ratification must be permitted an opportunity, equal
to the leaders', to make their views known.
4. Ratification votes should include only those affected by the contract.
222. There are no cases holding that members must ratify, and a great many cases rejecting the
claim. See supra notes 52 (fair representation), 57 (LMRDA). Secondly, the House of Representa-
tives in 1947 did adopt a provision that would have given union members the right to vote on various
union decisions, H.R. 3020 § 8(c)(8), 80th Cong., Ist Sess., in I NLRB LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY OF
THE LMRA 55, 616 (1949), but this guarantee did not become part of the LMRA as enacted. (Pro-
fessor Norman Cantor drew this fact to my attention). Thirdly, in the LMRDA, Congress expressly
required balloting to raise dues, LMRDA § 101(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (1976), and to elect
officers, LMRDA § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1976); this supports interpreting LMRDA § 101(a)(1)
and (2) as not requiring unions to hold any votes that they do not choose to hold, but merely requiring
equal extension of the franchise among union members, Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 139 (1964)
(discussed supra note 86). This interpretation is difficult to square with LMRDA cases holding that
deprivation of a democratic institution to everyone in the union does violate the LMRDA. See, e.g.,
Christopher v. Safeway Stores, 644 F.2d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 1981) (equal deprivation of rights under
union constitution); Wade v. Teamsters Local 247, 527 F. Supp. 1169, 1174-75 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
(union held no meetings at all); cf Monborne v. UMW, 342 F. Supp. 718, 723 (W.D. Pa. 1972)
(trusteeship may be found despite union contention that local arms never had any autonomy to lose).
These theories in the text attempt to be consistent with the Supreme Court decision in Calhoon
without creating a paradoxical union compliance with "equal rights" founded on universal despotism.
There are no cases of which I am aware that adopt either Clyde Summers' theory that the "equality"
protected is that of members as against leaders, see supra note 86, or my theory that ratification
should be a universal cure for the inevitable failings of union negotiators as fiduciaries, see supra note
115.
223. See supra note 115.
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(This may include employees who, while not actually working under the
contract in question, are significantly affected by it.)
5. Submission of a contract to ratification, or such a demand, is never
a failure to bargain in good faith unless used to surprise the other side, or
as a pretext to avoid reaching agreement.
6. The NLRB's contract bar rules should preclude employees' organi-
zational activity only when the employees themselves have ratified the
contract claimed to bar activity.
7. The normal remedy on a finding that employees have been de-
prived of their right under statute or the union's constitution to ratify a
contract should be an injunction against enforcement of the contract pend-
ing ratification under judicial supervision. Employees who prove mone-
tary loss from an unratified agreement should be able to recover damages
jointly from the offending union and management.
These prescriptions require, with the exception noted, no legislative
change. They follow from the text of the LMRDA, the demonstrated con-
gressional concern with elitist bargaining, and the persistent failure of
union self-correction as seen in the continuing cases brought by employees
victimized by elitist bargaining.
Adoption of these principles would hardly ensure industrial democracy.
They do not address problems of work reorganization, democratic job
structures, varieties of workers' participation, or union social and political
action. At most, they make collective bargaining somewhat more respon-
sive to employees.
Failure to adopt these prescriptions would not prevent unions from
adopting these methods voluntarily. It would, however, reveal the shal-
lowness of the national commitment to union democracy, the weakness of
any principle of union democracy, and the cynical use of limited grants of
democracy to advance particular public goals otherwise compatible with
elitist bargaining. Continued judicial confrontation with democracy in the
collective bargaining process will thus reveal a great deal about the demo-
cratic potential of labor law.
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